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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 
COLVILLE CONFEDERATED TRIBES , ) 
) 




BOYD WALTON, JR., et ux . 1 et ) 
al., STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) 
Interv. De f t., ) 
Defendants 1 ) 
) 
Consolidated with ) 
) 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 
) 




WILLIAM BOYD WALTON 1 et al. 1 ) 
) 
Defendants . ) 
No . 3421 
No. 3831 
16 BE IT REMEMBERED : 
17 That the above- entitled action came regularly on 
18 for continuation of hearing on Motion for Prelimi nary 
19 Injunction and final argument on Jul y 7, 1978 before the 
20 Honorable Marshall A. Neill , Judge, in the District Court 
21 of the United States, for the Eastern District of Washington 
22 Spokane, Washington; the Plaintiff Colville Confederated 
23 Tribes appearing by Mr. William H. Veeder and Mr. Stephen 
24 L. Palmberg; the Plaintiff United States of America 
25 appearing by Mr. Robert M. SWeeney; the Defendants Walton 




I appearing by Mr. Richard B. Pricei and the Defendant State 
2 of Washington appearing by Mr. Charles B . Roe, Jr., Mr. 
3 Robert E. Mack and Miss Laura Eckerti whereupon, the follow-



































Plaintiff United States 
Defendants Walton 
Defendant Washington State (Roe) 



















Court's Ruling on Injunction 



















July 7, 1978 
9:00 A.M. 
THE COURT: Good morning. 
COUNSEL IN UNISON: Good morning, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, this is the time set for 
6 summation on these two c ases, the Colville Confederated 
7 Tribes versus Walton and the United States versus Walton. 
a I don't know which is the best way to proceed. We have the 
9 plaintiffs on one side and the defendants on the other. Do 
10 counsel have any preference on how you want to proceed in 
11 this matter in argument? 
MR. SWEENEY: Well, I would think the 
13 plaintiff should proceed first. I think counsel for the 
14 Colville Confederated Tribes should go first. 
15 THE COURT: All right. I indicated in the 
16 second case you are the plaintiff. That is why I asked the 
17 question. 
11 MR. SWEENEY: Yes. 
19 THE COURT: All right. Well, then, Mr. 
20 Veeder, I think that will probably be the best procedure. 
21 MR. VEEDER: May it ple a s e t he Court, the 
22 primary, indeed the overriding i ssue, a s the Colville 
23 Confederated Tribes perceives it this morning, is the 
24 condition that prevails in regard to the availability of 
25 water in No Name Creek as of this date, July 7, 1978. 
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1 Your Honor, may I inquire, what are the time 
2 specifications? 
3 THE COURT: Counsel, b ecause of the complexi-
4 ties of the problem, I do not intend to put any particular 
5 time on this matter . I think anything that you can tell me 
6 that would be of help, I'm going to listen to. 
7 MR. VEEDER: And, I would be greatly pleased 
8 if Your Honor would ask questions, because it is most helpful 
9 to counsel . 
10 THE COURT: Well, all right. Let me outline 
11 some of the points that bother me 1 that seem to me, at least, 
12 to be the issues that have got to be decided in this case. 
13 Of course, first and primarily, I guess, I have got 
14 to make some finding as to quantity of water availability. 
15 In other words, how much water does the evidence show is 
16 available, what is the duty of that water as to irrigable 
17 acres, because the two have to be related in some manner. If 
18 the facts indicate there are excess waters, then we have the 
19 problem of what agency or what authority can allocate or 
20 control those excess waters. 
21 I think another issue that bothers me is the extent 
22 of the treaty rights as to the water duty. Clearly, under 
23 Winte rs, i t is irrigable acres, but there has been in this 
24 cas e t he que stion raised as to whether that is enlarged by 
25 the Lahontan trout project. I have a question as to whether 




1 that comes within the Winters doctrine or not. 
2 I think we further have the problem, in the Walton 
3 case specifically, whether or not the Waltons succeeded to 
4 whatever rights an individual member of the Tribe might have 
5 had. This goes to the quest ion you raised earlier, Mr. 
6 Veeder, are they reserved water rights for the Tribe or are 
7 they for the members of the Tribe, and specifically, may an 
8 Indian tribal member whose lands have been allotted to him, 
9 taken out of trust status, and then he conveys the fee, 
10 whether that carries with it his water rights, whatever those 
11 may be. If so, what right do the Waltons have to expand the 
12 then-existing irrigable lands, and, as I recall the record, 
13 at the time he took the property, I think they already had 
14 35 acres, as I recall, under irrigation, or something like 
15 that. Now, can that be expanded within a reasonable time. 
16 I have forgotten the name of the case . There is one that 
17 talks about that. 
11 Those are the matters that it seems to me we are 
19 faced with here . There may be others as we progress, but 
20 those are the ones that strike me at the moment as being the 
21 main problem. 
22 MR. VEEDER: I observe Your Honor didn't 
23 refer to the jurisdiction of the State of Washington. I 
24 assume that that is --
25 
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1 "If there are excess waters, what agency or -- " 
2 MR . VEEDER: I see. All right, Your Honor. 
3 Well, basically, Your Honor, I think that it is 
4 imperative this morning that we first allude to the issue of 
5 the availability of water. I think that that is the momen-
6 tary crisis, certainly from the sta ndpoint of the Col ville 
7 Confederated Tribes. We have , for that reason, placed upon 
8 the easel what we refer to as the Exhibit 25-lC. Now, that 
9 exhibit , on its face, discloses the ground water levels in 
10 the aquifer of 1976-77 and the elevations down to the 
11 arguments as they proceeded at the close of the case- in-chief 
12 As shown on 25-lC, there has been a dramatic and a 
13 critical decline in the availability of water in the aquifer 
14 for the remaining period. On June 16, -- I beg your pardon 
15 -- on June 26, because I knew that Your Honor from the first 
16 moment has referred to the availability of water as the most 
17 crucial, we filed what was referred to as Renewed Petition 
11 for Preliminary Injunction , and attached to that petition 
19 was data bringing down to date, to the date of the 26th, the 
20 continued precipitous decline of water in the aquifer. At 
21 that time, it was evident, and by affidavits we projected 
22 that in regard to the well which we have alluded to as 
23 Colville No. 2 well, we had projected that we would be out 
24 of water by July 10 . We had also projected that by the 
25 middle of July , the Paschal Sherman well, which is the 




1 northern well, would be in grave difficulty. The center 
2 well, which is Colville No . l, we projected would be in 
3 serious difficulty before the end of the irrigation season . 
4 We would be forced greatly to curtail the pumpage from that 
5 well. 
6 Our most recent data, Your Honor, is 7:00 o'clock 
1 this morning, and it is evident that the decline in the 
8 water table has continued at a most alarming rate. There has 
9 however , been one change that I think is most significant. 
10 Mr. Walton shut down pumping on the lst of July. He shut 
11 down, as we understand it, the diversion of water from No 
12 Name Creek as of the lst of July. Now, whether he started 
13 up this morning or not, after 7:00 o'clock, I don't know, but 
14 what we do know is that the drain by Mr. Walton 's diversion 
15 has reduced momentarily the threat with which we were 
16 confronted on the 26th, That threat was that we would have 
11 to cut off probably today or tomorrow. We think there has 
11 been a momentary reprieve because Mr. Walton's interference 
19 has been taken away as of this time. So, there is clearly 
20 established the immediate and direct and all-encompassing 
21 conflict between these two users, the Colville Confederated 
ll Tribes and the Waltons . That there is insufficient water in 
23 that aquifer is indisputable. There is not enough water 
24 there, so by probably Monday or Tuesday, the irreparable 
25 damage that we are now suffering will become as acute as it 




1 was when Mr . Walton was pumping, as of the end of June, so 
1 there is no surplus water as of today. 
3 We have had to cut out 30 acres of land in 903, 
4 Your Honor. One of the lower allotments has been shut down 
5 entirely. So we are today suffering irreparable damage. We 
6 are today, the Colville Confederated Tribes as of toda~ are 
7 losing revenue. They are losing prospects of hay for their 
8 operation of the Paschal Sherman Indian School. They are 
9 actually, from the standpoint of operations, being truly 
10 destroyed, insofar as their ongoing crops as of this moment. 
11 That is the circumstance that prevails as of this moment. 
11 It is most significant, Your Honor, and while I am 
13 stating this, Your Honor, I hope that you let me file an 
14 affidavit nunc pro tunc on this because I am having an 
15 affidavit on these very points prepared to show as of this 
16 moment the serious circumstances that prevail, the critical 
17 circumstances. The momentary diminution of irreparable 
18 damage by Mr. Walton's shut-dawn in service of ground water 
19 pumping reflects, as I said before, the total and complete 
10 conflict between the Waltons and the Colvilles, and it brings 
11 us down to the crucial, to what I believe to· be the over-
22 riding legal issue, and that overriding legal issue is this : 
13 Where does the title to the rights to the use of the wa ter 
14 in No Name Creek surface and ground water basin reside? 
15 Where does that title reside? 




1 That brings us to the overriding legal issues to 
2 which you alluded, and we have in that connection, hopefully, 
3 and made it useful for Your Honor, we have summarized in a 
4 motion filed on June 8, 1978 by the Colville Confederated 
5 Tribes, attempted to bring these points forward for 
6 resolution, and, indeed, they follow very strikingly the 
7 legal propositions that Your Honor raised. 
8 But before I go further, Your Honor, because I want 
9 to underscore a point of great concern stemming from your 
10 statement, you stated that there were 35 acres that was 
11 being irrigated when Mr. Walton acquired the property. I 
12 respectfully submit, Your Honor, that I have no recollection 
13 of 35 acres, but more importantly, I believe, from the 
14 standpoint of the legal issues presented here, the Hibner 
15 case, to which I think you were alluding, would not encompass 
16 the 35 acres if there were such used. I don't recall, as I 
17 said, that there were ever 35 acres used by anyone antecedent 
II to the acquisition in 1948 by the Defendant Waltons. I 
19 really don't think there were. But I'm not going to argue 
20 that point because I would have to check it out, but I don't 
21 believe it is, but that would be the situation. But we do 
22 know, that the Indians, antecedent to the sale of their 
23 property to non-Indians, -- and I think it is important that 
24 Waltons bought from non-Indians. They didn't buy it from 
25 Indians -- at that time, when the lands left the Indian 




1 ownership, there was no diversion or use of water by the 
2 owners of those three allotments. No water had been diverted 
~ and used by the Indians at that time. 
4 THE COURT: Counsel, assuming that is true, 
5 and I don•t recall all of the facts until I review them, but 
6 if that is the situation under Hibner, would the non-Indian 
7 grantee from the Indian have a reasonable time in which to 
8 exercise the rights he might have, that the Indian might hav~ 
9 MR . VEEDER: I don•t think so, Your Honor. I 
10 don •t think so . 
11 THE COURT: I think that is one of the issues 
12 I have . 
13 MR. VEEDER: There are two phases there. The 
14 first issue in Hibner, which I respectfully submit has no 
15 application here because Hibner is so vastly different. 
16 Bear in mind these a llotments in Hibner were all off the 
17 reservation . They were subject to a separate agreement in 
18 regard to water rights. Those Indians had been using some 
19 water off of the reservation, and so far as I know, the 
20 Shoshone- Bannocks, the Treaty of 1868 no longer pertained 
21 to them because it was, really, overruled by the 1906 -- I 
22 mean, made no longer applicable by the 1906 agreement that 
23 brought -- I beg your pardon, it was the 1898 agreement, 
24 that reduced the reservation and took these lands out of the 
25 reservation, the Fort Hall Reservation over here in Idaho. 
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I So there are those drastic differences. 
Now, I have answered what I believe to be the 
3 correct l aw in regard to the first aspect of Hibner. One, 
4 there was no utilization by the Indians when they sold the 
5 land. 
6 Now, secondly, the issue arose in Hibner in regard 
7 to what are the rights of the non-Indian purchaser after he 
a buys these lands that were outside of the reservation, and 
9 which were subject to a separate and distinct agreement? 
10 And the court said that these lands outside the reservation 
11 would have application, the state l aw would have application, 
12 and here's a unique thing: In the Hibner case, as is true 
13 in regard to the State of Idaho, the statutory procedure for 
14 the acquisition of rights of use of water, it is not a strict 
15 appropriation state. In other words, you can acquire rights 
16 to the use of water in Idaho by diverting and applying the 
17 water to beneficial use without complying with state law. 
11 After 1917 in the State of Washington, that is not true. 
19 In 1 917, the State of Washington, and I don ' t-- it is a 
20 little strange for me to be quoting the law to you, Your 
21 Honor, who has been on the Supreme Court of the State of 
22 Washington , but I 'm sure that is the case, that in 1917 
23 they came down with what they called a strict requirement 
24 for compliance, and there was no strict requirement by 
25 purchasers of the land. It was not until, if memory serves 




1 me, Mr. Walton bought his land on August 16, 1948. Now , he 
2 knew he didn 1 t have a water right, so he went down to the 
3 state eight days later, on August 24, 1948, and filed an 
4 application to get a water right. Now, that is the situation 
5 Your Honor. Mr. Walton, the first act after title passed to 
6 him, was to undertake to comply with the state law, and the 
7 immediate issue there, and I think it is a crucial issue, 
a and I think Your Honor put your finger on it immediately, 
9 did he acquire a right to use of water by diversion use of 
10 water after, and by complying with state l aw after 1948? 
11 We , of course, say that the state has no jurisdic-
12 tion whatever . We say that that is the situation, and we 
13 rely upon an unbroken series of Ninth Circuit cases on that 
14 proposition. I think the first case that is important 
15 that was the Montana case of Winters -- where the Ninth 
16 Circuit said the state cannot permit the acquisition of 
17 rights to use of water that would interfere with the Fort 
11 Belknap Indians that were living on the Milk River. 
19 THE COURT: Counsel, on another point, on 
20 Monday of this week, the Supreme Court carne down with a 
11 case, and none of us have the opinion yet, but there is a 
22 summary of the opinion in the Wall Street Journal of Monday 
23 and Tuesday. 
24 MR. VEEDER: That is the case in the Central 
25 Valley of California? 




1 THE COURT: No, according to the news release, 
2 it had to do with what may be a change in the Supreme Court's 
3 opini on as to the rights as .federal versus state on public 
4 lands. Now, it's apparently not a treaty case, and so it 
5 may not have any bearing here. I know counse l and Court 
6 have not even had a chance to see the opinion, but I think 
7 it has got to be read to see on what you are talking about 
8 right now. 
9 MR. VEEDER: May I --
10 THE COURT: As to whether the state has any 
11 rights in this matter. If the press rel eases are correct, 
12 there has been some modi f ication of the prior rulings on 
13 the inter-governmental rights on water in publ ic land, non-
14 treaty. It may hav e nothing to do with it , but I think , 
15 when we finish this today, counsel ought to have an 
16 opportunity to read that case and advise what they think. 
17 MR . VEEDER : Can I just make a run at those 
11 two cases. There are two cases that carne dawn. I'm not 
19 sure whether Your Honor is referring to the Mimbres. 
20 THE COURT: That is the one. 
21 MR. VEEDER: That is a nationa l forest case --
22 THE COURT: Right. 
23 MR. VEEDER: -- I hope Mr . Price doesn't mind 
24 - - with which I have some familiarity. It is a situation 
25 there, totally different from this situation. In New Mexico, 




1 the issue that was there, when they withdrew the lands for 
2 the national forest, did they reserve rights in the national 
3 forest for purposes of recreation, see? Now, that is 
4 totally, if I may respectfully submit, Your Honor, different 
5 from this situation here . 
6 THE COURT: Well, I merely bring it up 
7 because, until counsel has a chance to read the opinion and 
8 the Court can, we don't know, and I won't prejudge that. 
9 MR. VEEDER: Well, we had followed that case 
10 very carefully and I have to admit that I have been travel-
11 ing and I didn't get a copy of the case, but I do know what 
12 went before the court and I doknow what was reflected there 
13 in the Mimbres case, M-i-m-b-r-e-s. I don't know haw you 
14 pronounce it in Spanish. But I don't believe that that 
15 situation would have anything to do with this case because, 
16 Your Honor, I think we better take a look at the overall 
17 picture and about what transpired in the Winters situation, 
18 because the reason for the establishment, the basic reason 
19 for the establishment of the Colville Indian Reservation was 
20 to provide a permanent home and a biding place for the 
21 Colville Confederated Tribes, and as Winters has said, and 
22 the Arizona v. California said, these reservations of right 
23 to the use of water were not limited to the time of the 
24 reservation, but were for the future, and, more than that, 
25 Winters has express reference to the fact that the Indians 




1 had the rights for agriculture, grazing their herds, or the 
2 arts of civilization. In other words, the Winters doctrine 
3 conceptually looked to the reservation as a place for human 
4 beings to reside and whatever the Mimbres case says, I 
5 submit to Your Honor that it differs drastically from what 
6 the Colville Confederated Tribe needs and requires today. 
7 Nor do I think that there is a single authority that supports 
8 the concept in regard to an Indian reservation that, within 
9 the scope of the rights, whatever the measure should be here, 
10 that they would be restricted in their use of water, and I 
11 think that that is what Your Honor is referring to, what were 
12 the concepts when the Colville Indian Reservation was created 
13 and what would be the effects of a change in use. 
14 Because Your Honor had referred specifically to 
15 that issue, I went back and made a review of the very earlie 
16 cases that I could find and I realize that I'm not going to 
17 try and file another brief or anything, but I did go back to 
18 the early cases in the New England States, and some of the 
19 cases turned on agreements that were entered into during the 
20 Revolutionary War, and I find absolutely not one single case 
21 that says that there could not be a change in use in regard 
22 to the case of water. In other words, I do not believe that 
23 there is any kind of a straitjacket concept that would say 
24 that the Colville Confederated Tribes would be limited to the 
25 utilization of waters as of 18 72, and the only limitations 




1 that I have been able to find, Your Honor, in this connec-
2 tion are the specific limitations that are imposed by the 
3 police power of the state in regard to the citizens of the 
4 state who come within the purview of that police power. 
5 It is extremely important, I believe, to emphasize 
6 here, Your Honor, that the interests of the State of 
7 Washington does not pertain to title. It is an exercise of 
a the police regulations over the citizens that they have 
9 control and not a granting of title. Now, we haven't put 
10 that into our brief, but Your Honor has raised the point 
11 that I think is significant here, that, what does the state 
12 do? The state is simply outlining the basis upon which 
13 rights to the use of water can be acquired, but the title 
14 passes from the United States of America, pursuant to the 
15 conduit of state law, in regard to unappropriated waters on 
16 the public lands. 
17 I think that that is a drastic difference than the 
11 issue of title and, of course, I agree with Your Honor, in the 
19 Mimbres case that is important. 
20 Now, there is another case that I will just allude 
21 to very rapidly, and that is the case in the Central Valley 
12 of California, where the headlines, I think in error, said 
23 that the states have control over water on a reclamation 
24 project, and certainly that has no application here. That 
25 was limited to the 1902 Act, and the Central Valley Federal 




1 Reclamation Project. 
1 So, I have touched upon those crucial points, Your 
3 Honor, as to what we are looking at, and what we are con-
4 cerned with here, as to who has the power and the control 
5 over these rights to the use of water, and it goes back to 
6 the crucial issue, Your Honor , the crucial issue of, where 
7 does the title of the rights to the use of water at this 
8 moment in the No Name Creek Basin reside? Where does that 
9 title reside? And I respectfully submit, it is the position 
10 of the Colville Confederated Tribes in this case that the 
JJ title was first vested in the Tribes on July 2nd of 1872. 
11 That is when the reservation was created, and predicated 
13 upon the concept of the Winters doctrine, the full equitable 
14 title passed to the Tribes. That is another matter that we 
15 briefed extensively, and I don't believe I need to go into 
16 it. 
17 So, i n connection with the correlative principles 
11 of law, however, that are governing here, when did the title 
19 pass out of the Colville Confederated Tribes, if indeed it 
10 did, and we deny that it ever passed out of the Tribes after 
11 it once became vested . We have cited extensive law to Your 
11 Honor in our briefs, and I do not need to reiterate them 
13 because you have the briefs before you, that absent specific 
14 language from the Congress of the United States, the title, 
15 once having vested in the Colville Confederated Tribes, 




1 continues to reside in the Tribes. And here is a crucial 
2 issue that I respectfully submit must be looked to. 
3 We put in our prima facie case, the Colville 
4 Confederated Tribes did, put in their prima facie case as 
5 to title when there was offered in evidence the executive 
6 order of July 2, 1872, and it is uncontested by the 
7 Department of Justice, by the State of Washington, and by 
8 Mr. Walton's briefs, that indeed the Winters doctrine is 
9 applicable to these rights. 
10 So, I respectfully submit, the burden moved to them 
11 to show that in some manner the title moved out of the 
12 Confederated Tribes, apparently they say into the allottees, 
13 and from the allottees into the non-Indian predecessors of 
14 interest to the Waltons. 
15 Now, I have searched the law most carefully on 
16 this proposition, and there is not a single case in point 
17 on the subject, so I think there are two controlling 
18 statutes to which we should turn our attention. 
19 The first is 25 u.s.c. 194, and that 25 u.s.c. 194 
20 says this: that once the Indian has proved the prima facie 
21 case, the burden moves to the white men, and that is the 
22 language of the statute, to prove that in some manner, the 
23 I ndian has lost his title, and I respectfully submit there 
24 is not a scintilla of evidence or word of law that shows that 
15 the Defendant Waltons have sustained their burden of proof 




1 here under that statute . 
2 The next statute is 25 u.s.c. 381, with which we 
3 are very familiar, and we have argued it before, and 25 
4 u.s.c. 381 precludes the vesting of title in the Waltons 
5 because, as we have argued before, it says that the rights 
6 to the use of water in areas such as the semi-arid Colville 
7 Indian Reservation , those waters will be allocated by just 
a and equal distribution pursuant to rules and regulations 
9 promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, and the 
10 crucial and controlling issues are the terms, a just and 
11 equitable distribution among the Indians residing on the 
12 Colville Indian Reservation, and that language, I bel ieve, 
13 is controlling here , I respectfully submit, Your Honor. 
14 There could be no just and equal distribution of the avail-
15 able water supply if the rights had passed to the allottees 
16 pursuant to the 1887 Act , and pursuant to the 1 906 Act, 
17 making it applicab le to the Colville Confederated Tribes. 
18 If I may take a moment , I~ink that I can-- if 
19 I were taller, I would be able to. I have a good man that 
20 is six-foot, two or three . That is what we need . 
21 (Turning to exhibit on easel.} 
22 Your Honor, we are confronted today with the very 
23 issue that I am talking about, the very premise that I am 
24 talking about . 
25 The only act that pertains to Indian rights to the 




1 use of water and the Allotment Act and the Act of 1906, the 
2 only language is what I just recited to Your Honor, a just 
3 and equal distribution among the Indians residing on the 
4 reservation. 
5 Now, we have here Allotment 526 and 892. Those 
6 are the Colville allotments north of Mr. Walton's property. 
7 Now, had there been an investiture of title to water as to 
a the ownership of Allotment 526 and 892 , there could be no 
9 just and equitable distribution because a just and equitable 
10 distribution is really a month-by-month allocation just like 
11 we are confronted with today. 
12 If 526, being the uppermost allotment, had a 
13 vested right to a specific quantity of water, he would say, 
14 yes, I'm going out and use that water on this land and I'm 
15 not going to share it with another allottee . So 892 and 526, 
16 which overlie the No Name Creek groundwater basin, would 
17 have a preeminent right over the 901 and 903, who are down-
18 stream from Mr. Walton. There could not be a just and equal 
19 distribution under those circumstances. 
20 THE COURT: Well, Counsel, taking that same 
21 theory, if each Indian who is allotted certain land has an 
22 allocable right in the water under that statute, and if 
23 there is a shortage of water, then under the allocation and 
24 the allotment theory, all irrigable acres would have to 
25 share in the shortage. Wouldn't this fo llow? 




1 MR. VEEDER: Within the No Name creek basin . 
2 THE COURT: Well, I'm talking about this basin 
3 of course. 
4 MR. VEEDER: Yes. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Now, if land has a 




MR. VEEDER: I think we will take that --
THE COURT: -- that is what we are fighting 
10 about . How can you say, then 1 that an Indian allottee who 
11 has his allocable rights 1 proportionate right of water in 
u the basin, cannot pass that on to a non-Indian? If y ou say 
13 that, you are taking away one of his basic rights. In other 
14 words, --
15 MR . VEEDER: To a just and equal distribution? 
16 THE COURT: His land is rather valueless if 
17 he cannot transfer it without a water right. 
13 MR. VEEDER: Well, Your Honor, what Your 
19 Honor is -- well, I have to disagree with it for this reason, 
20 Your Honor: It is very obvious to me that if Mr. Walton 
21 purchased a water right 1 which I deny, then I think there 
21 could have been ruling by this Court, -- well, when was it? 
2i -- 1970, saying it is quite obvious that these three allot-
24 ments take from the Indians all of their water rights because 
25 there is not enough water in this aquifer for the rest of 




1 them. So the Indian who immediately sold his water right, 
2 at the same time dried up 526 a nd 892 and 901 and 903. That 
3 would be the situation that would prevail today. So, 
4 Congress , in its wisdom, said this: We are not talking about 
5 allottees in regard to water rights, we are talking about 
6 Indians residing on the reservation. That's what we're 
1 talking about. And that being the case , it is totally 
8 consonant with the idea of a permanent home and a biding 
9 place because of those three allotments that went out of 
10 ownership of Indians in the early '20s, could take from 901 
II and 903 , which were operating at the time -- they were using 
11 water at the time -- but when they passed out of ownership, 
13 the concept that Your Honor advanced would result in drying 
14 up those allotments. It would result in drying up 526 a nd 
15 892 because there i s not enough water. We have proved that 
16 consistently since 1975. There is not enough water for all 
17 of them , and a just and equal distribution of water among 
18 the Indians is the only fair and practical way of handling 
19 these rights to the use of water. It is the only way it can 
20 be done and have these lands habitable for the Indian people. 
11 There would be no water in here if there passed to each one 
22 of the Indians a quantity of water sufficient to meet his 
13 needs because the moment he sold that land, the very second 
24 that he sold that land, he would deprive the other Indians 
15 who are forced to participate in this short supply of water 




1 or die . 
1 THE COURT: Well , I don't know that that 
3 necessarily follows because it would seem that if that 
4 statute can be construed to include the successor of interest 
5 to an Indian, then that successor may have to share in the 
6 allocation of the shortage also because certainly all the 
7 Indians who still reside on the reservation may have to have 
8 the water allocated, proportioned, as you have indicated. 
9 The thing that is bothering me is whether or not you can say 
10 to that statute that the Indian who, prior to the time of 
11 the Allotment Act, simply had an inchoate or a r i ght in 
11 common with all of the rest of the tribal members to use 
13 water for their reservation purposes, to say that the 
14 Congress intended by that statute to deprive the all ott ee of 
15 any water simply takes away that Indian ' s right; doesn't it? 
16 MR. VEEDER: No, Your Honor. I don't think 
17 Congress said we will deprive the Indians of the rights of 
11 the use of water . It says they will have a just and equal 
19 distribution of the water. There is a vast diff erence . 
20 Congress, may I respectfull y submit , 10 years earlier, by 
21 the Desert Land Act , had taken away from the public lands 
22 all rights to the use of water, so when a man got a homestead 
23 he didn't get any water rights at all. Didn't get any . 
24 Stripped every drop of water from every homestead land after 
25 1877 . So, there is nothing unusual about Congress ' saying, 
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1 we will control the water rights with one hand and control 
2 the land with the other. Congress knew what it was doing, 
3 it knew its language, it said specifically that it is the 
4 Indians who will participate, not the allottees, and here 
5 is the crucial point: An I ndian allottee on the land like 
6 we have now, Sam Sampson, who is the owner of 901 , and his 
7 mother, are there . They are willing to participate with the 
8 other tracts of land on a just and equal distribution . But 
9 there could be no just and equal distribution, could be no 
10 just and equal distribution among the Indians if the Waltons 
11 under that statute have any rights to the use of water . 
12 There couldn't be. 
13 I think it is very significant, Your Honor, though, 
14 because you have raised the point that I want to allude to. 
15 I have read very carefully the cases and the briefs by Mr. 
16 Price. He does not say the Waltons have the right to 
17 monopolize the water, although they have been monopolizing 
18 it, though, since whenever they started irrigating in t he 
19 '50s, they have been taking all of the water. I think that 
20 is most significant. But Mr . Price doesn't say that 526 and 
21 892 and 901 and 903 are not entitled to something. So, we 
12 are in this position in regard to the prel iminary injunction 
23 that is so much in my mind this morning, is that Mr. Walton 
24 has not come forward and said one thing about what he would 
25 share. This is extremely important . Now, I am not 




1 equivocating on the point. I am not backing off in any sense 
2 of the word that we should share with the Waltons. We don't 
3 I mean the Colvilles -- but I think it is most significant 
4 that there is not a single brief that has been filed that 
5 says that Walton can continue to do what he has been doing, 
6 and, a fortiori, I think it is extremely important, moreover, 
7 that Mr. Walton has been taking the developed water out of 
8 the stream and diverting it and using it, and I mean the 
9 water that has been pumped, very costly water, has been used 
10 last year and this year, and I think we have to have a 
11 restraining order against that. 
u But let me continue for a moment, Your Honor, in 
13 regard to some recent cases that I think are of overwhelming 
14 importance. I think that the case of what we call the 
15 Hill case, the TVA case, and the cases that have been cited, 
16 are of extreme importance in regard to this litigation. They 
17 are important from two aspects. 
11 The Hill case that came down on the very day of our 
19 last argument here, the Supreme Court came down and said this 
20 Yes, the Endangered Species Act can stop a hundred-million-
21 dollar project because of the endangered species, and that 
22 certainly supports our position in regard to the use of water 
23 for the Lahontan cutthroat trout. But I think far more 
24 important, from the standpoint of the issue that Your Honor 
25 has raised, is the language of the Supreme Court in regard 




1 to the interpretation of 25 u.s.c. 381. There were arguments 
2 very similar to what Your Honor just raised, which is a valid 
3 argument. Stop and think what this means from an economic 
4 standpoint. Mr . Walton without any water will have dry land 
5 because certainly the Colville Confederated Tribes are 
6 utilizing all of the water now that they can and they would 
7 utilize all that Mr. Walton has been taking and still be 
a short of water. We know that. But the Supreme Court, in 
9 the Hill case, said this, with great specificity, it is not 
10 for the judiciary to rewrite the statute, and I respectfully 
11 submit, Your Honor, in response to the point that you just 
12 made, that Your Honor would be acting in the legislative 
13 field if we attempted to change the language of 25 u.s.c. 381 
14 because 25 u.s.c. 381 is clear beyond question. It is 
15 limited strictly to Indians. Now, I cited the authorities 
16 in there and I don't have to go through the brief again, 
17 but --
11 THE COURT: Well, Counsel, I am in absolute 
19 agreement with what you said about what the Supreme Court 
20 said in the TVA case, and as unsound, socially and economi-
21 cally as the result is, I agree that it is a correct deci-
22 sion that the judiciary cannot say that the Congress did not 
23 have the power to say what they said, but I don't think that 
24 is the problem I face here. 
25 I have a statute facing me here, which, as you 




1 indicated, talks about allocation of water to Indians. The 
1 question that I'm troubled by is whether or not we are not 
3 taking away the right of an Indian if we take away his right 
4 to transfer his share of that water. That is an Indian's 
5 right under the Allotment Act . Prior to the Allotment Act, 
6 we wouldn't have this problem. Whatever water was there was 
7 allocable in common to the residents of the reservation, but 
8 Congress came along and said, now we're going to change our 
9 policy on the reservation . We are now going to let an Indian 
10 actually own his proportionate share of the reservation. 
11 MR. VEEDER: That's right. 
12 THE COURT: And it seems to me that one of 
13 the problems I face is: Did Congress intend that that 
14 Indian allottee be deprived of a very important right of his 
15 share of the reservation if you take his water away? 
16 MR. VEEDER: Your Honor, I don't -- I 
17 respectfully submit that Congress had two things at which it 
18 was looking. It was looking to the fact that it created a 
19 permanent home and biding place by the reservation, and 
10 everything to the contrary notwithstanding, certainly the 
21 same -- and the other cases say that -- precisely in regard 
2l to the Colville Reservation . But it said this: We know --
23 and this is the language -- it says, we know that where there 
14 is a shortage of water, there has to be a just and equal 
15 distribution or the one who gets the water first is going 




1 to kill off the rest of them , and that is the situation. 
2 Assuming there had been no delivery of water -- sale of 
3 lands to the Waltons at all, the first allottee would be 
4 able, in the periods of shortage, to dominate a l l of the 
5 stream, and the other Indians would be dried up, and the 
6 rational e of 25 u.s.c . 381 says, we are not goin g to permit 
7 that. If an Indi an is residing on the reservation and 
8 irrigating land, he will be entitled to a just and equal 
9 share of that water . 
10 THE COURT : Isn't there a reasonable middle 
11 ground, and that is that, if the Indian allottee has the 
12 right to transfer his share of the available water on the 
13 reservation under 381, that right is also subj e ct to 
14 allocation in y e ars of shortage , which Mr . Walton woul d have 
15 to share in that shortage? In other words, it . isn't an 
16 absolute right , it is a right only to obtain the same right 
17 that his Indian predecessor had in that same l and . 
11 MR. VEEDER: In other words --
19 THE COURT: Isn ' t that possible? 
20 MR. VEEDER: I truly don't think so, Your 
21 Honor, I truly don't think so, for this reason: that the 
l2 situation that we are confronted with as of this moment is 
23 this: that when Mr. Walton shut down his well, there was an 
24 immediate recovery in the wells north of him . There was that 
25 immediate recovery . When Mr . Walton throws his well on agai~ 
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1 and I assume that is going to occur, that we are going to 
2 find that he is going to dry up 892, probably, b ecause he 
3 is sitting at the end of the aquifer . Now, if that occurs, 
4 there certainly is no just and equal distribution t here, 
5 and there has been no proposal by anybody as to what would 
6 be a just and equal distribution , but, once again , I don ' t 
7 want to have t his argument interpreted as an agreemen t that 
8 anything p assed to Mr. Walton. 
9 THE COURT : I understand that . 
10 MR. VEEDER: But what I am saying is that , 
11 if Mr . Walton had bought a homestead, he wouldn ' t have gotten 
ll a drop of water , and when Mr. Walton bought these three 
13 allotments, in his own mind he didn't think he got any water. 
14 What did he do? He went straight down and tried to get an 
15 appropriation from the state. He was in error, but he didn't 
16 think he was get ting any water or he wouldn't h ave do ne that . 
17 I think that t h i s is extremely important. Those dat es a re 
II very important . Mr . Wal ton bought the land on August 1 6, 
19 1948. August 24, 1948 he went down and tried to get himself 
20 some water. That is what he did. He didn't thi nk -- I have 
21 been looking at his appraisals . I have been looking at the 
2l price that he paid . I studied it carefully, and I do not 
23 find an evaluation of that land as irrigable land, and I 
24 respectfully submit that when this gentleman, who was an 
25 assessor , was on the stand for the defendants , he was unable 
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1 to tell the difference between an appropriative right and 
2 a Winters doctrine right, and I find nothing to indicate, 
3 not one word to indicate that when the Waltons acquired this 
4 land that they paid for irrigable land, because the land 
5 wasn't being irrigated, as far as I can tell from the record, 
6 and second, it doesn't appear that the appraisal,when the 
7 land went out of the ownership of the Indians who are owners, 
8 that they got any more money by reason of the fact that the 
9 land was traversed by No Name Creek. I find not one 
10 scintilla of evidence to support that, and I don't find any 
11 evidence in the record on that. So, whatever may be the 
12 economic concepts, which are perfectly proper, that Your 
13 Honor raised, I find nothing in this case to support the 
14 concept that he paid extra money because it was land with 
15 water. I don't find any. 
16 But I reiterate that it is the usual and not the 
17 unusual that when a man gets title from the national govern-
18 ment, that he doesn't get any water rights . I happen to know 
19 that very well because my family has got homesteads in 
20 Montana and I was raised on one, and I will guarantee you, 
21 we didn't have any water. So there is nothing unusual about 
22 that situation, that a man gets some land and he doesn't get 
23 any water and he doesn't get any water unless there is some 
24 available. So, we are not looking at anything unique or 
25 anything harsh, but we are looking at the price -- the 




1 precise language of 25 u.s .c. 381. 
2 Now, I have been watching my watch, Your Honor, and 
3 I see that I have run on here for almost an hour, but there 
4 is one final thing that Your Honor has raised, and that is 
5 about using the water for the Lahontan cutthroat trout. 
6 It is the position that we are taking here, Your 
7 Honor , that the Colville Confederated Tribes are permitted 
a to use and authorized to use the water, the title which 
9 resides in that, for any beneficial use , and we feel, Your 
10 Honor , that that encompasses, particularly under the 
11 Endangered Species Act, the right to use water t o provide a 
12 habitat for the Lahontan cutthroat trout to survive . 
13 Now, the use of that water today is of paramount 
14 importance because the fish have spawned, the fry, some of 
15 them have hatched and others are hatching as of this moment. 
16 Maybe that is an overstatement . I ' m not out there. I don't 
17 know if they are hatching as of this moment, but we do know 
11 that they were hatching as of yesterday,and the important 
19 thing is that they have to have water down there, and it has 
20 to be of a temperature that is adequate to keep it from 
11 destroying them, so we are taking the position here, Your 
l2 Honor, that the matter of title that continues to reside in 
13 the Colville Confederated Tribes, and no one has shown that 
24 it has moved out, i s that they can utilize that water, 
15 particularly for an endangered or threatened species, and 




1 that the Hill case to which you have just alluded, and the 
2 TVA case,is extremely important in that connection. It is of 
3 overriding importance because of the national policy in that 
4 connection. 
5 Now, Your Honor, I am hopeful that I will have a 
6 chance to respond as the plaintiff for at least a few minutes 
7 THE COURT: All right. 
8 Mr. Sweeney, you are the plaintiff in the companion 
9 case. Maybe you ought to get your oar in and then we will 
10 get to the defense side of the whole matter. 
11 MR. SWEENEY: All right. 
12 MR. PRICE: Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Mr. Price. 
14 MR. PRICE: May I speak with Mr. sweeney for 






THE COURT: You may. 
(Off-the-record discussion 
between counsel.) 
MR. PRICE: Thank you, Your Honor . 
MR. SWEENEY: Well, Your Honor, on behalf of 
21 the United States, I will try to be brief. 
22 First of all, I would say that the Government 
23 finds much to agree with in the basic principles enunciated 
24 by Mr. Veeder. We also find in a number of areas that we 
25 disagree with Mr. Veeder's analysis of the law and, as a 




1 matter of fact, with some of the facts, but particularly the 
2 law as it applies to the water rights to the No Name Creek 
3 basin. 
4 First of all, those two cases decided by the 
5 Supreme Court on Monday, the Mimbres Valley case, I haven't 
6 seen that decision; however, I am aware of the New Mexico 
7 Supreme Court decision, which was upheld by the Supreme 
a Court, and that dealt with -- it was a water adjudication 
9 proceeding in New Mexico concerning the Gila National Forest 
10 and rights reserved for the National Forest, and the Supreme 
11 Court of New Mexico held that there were rights reserved by 
12 the United States when it created the National Forest, what-
13 ever year it was, 1907 or something like that, for the 
14 specific purposes enunciated in the Forest Act, the Basic 
15 Organic Forest Act, which were watershed protection, produc-
16 tion of timber, and those matters. However, the Government 
17 contended that it also had a right to a reserve right dating 
11 back to the date of reservation of those lands for the 
19 National Forest for grazing purposes , for wildlife protection 
20 and also for recreatio~, and the Supreme Court of New Mexico 
21 disallowed those rights to the United States, and, apparentl~ 
22 the United States Supreme Court has upheld the Supreme Court 
23 of New Mexico in that regard, but it doesn ' t have any 
24 relationship to the establishment of rights on an Indian 
25 reservation through a treaty or executive order. 




1 Now, the other case that was decided is the new 
2 Melones Dam, which is U. S. v. California, out of the Ninth 
3 Circuit. It was also decided on Monday. That involved the 
4 Section VIII of the 1902 Reclamation Act, and whether or not 
5 a state, in allowing the Bureau of Reclamation to appropriate 
6 waters within a state for a reclamation project,would be 
7 subject to conditions imposed by the state. The Ninth 
8 Circuit well, first of all , the District Court held that 
9 the United States was not held to such conditions. The 
10 Ninth Circuit also held that the United States could not be 
11 held subject to conditions imposed by the state,based on 
12 Hancock v. Train, as a matter of fact . It has gone to the 
13 Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit has been reversed, but 
14 strangely enough, -- I received about half of that decision 
15 in a Telefax yesterday from Washington. It is almost 
16 indecipherable. So I am not going to offer it to the Court, 
17 but as a matter of fact, just as an academic interest in some 
11 other cases that occurred before the Court recently, Hancock 
19 v . Train was not even mentioned by the Supreme Court in 
20 reaching its decision. It went entirely on the administra-
21 tive history and the background of the Section VIII of the 
22 1902 Act, which does require compliance with certain state 
23 procedures for the Bureau of Reclamation to initiate a water 
24 project. Now, that case, I think, would have application 
25 probably to Kittitas v . Sunnyside, t o Acquavella.It would not , 




1 in my submission, and I haven't seen the case, but from what 
2 I understand and what I can read from the part I saw, it 
3 would not have an application in this case, although it does 
4 speak to federal-state relationships in the West about water 
5 rights. 
6 Now, the Court outlined a number of points that 
7 you felt should be addressed by the parties in this case. 
8 Now, the finding as to the water availability, as 
9 Mr . Veeder has pointed out, I think that under the present 
10 state of affairs, and as it has existed since the Tribe 
11 embarked upon the program of development in 1975 and 
12 culminating now, it is obvious that there is not enough 
13 water available for the use of all of the parties to irrigate 
14 the alfalfa fields that are available. You have Mr . Watson's 
15 testimony, in which he says a firm supply of 550 acre feet 
16 will come nowhere near being sufficient, not only for both 
17 Walton and the Tribe, which totals about 333 acres, 228 
11 acres for the Tribe and about 105 for the Waltons, and based 
19 on a 3~- to 4-foot, acre foot, duty, it wouldn 't cover that 
20 amount. Mr. Jones f igured 700 to 850 acre supply, and, as 
21 a matter of fact, so did Mr. Cline figure about an 800-acre-
21 feet supply which would also not be enough, then said that 
23 1100 could be garnered out of the aquifer if the irrigation 
24 practices were changed and there was a more heavy stress put 
25 upon the aquifer, but that would be looking at a very 




1 speculative situation and not a situation that actually 
2 exists . So I have to agree that at this point in time the 
3 evidence certainly shows that there is not enough water 
4 available within that No Name Creek Valley and No Name Creek 
5 stream and that No Name Creek aquifer to supply all of the 
6 needs for irrigation purposes for Mr. Walton and for the 
7 Colville .Tr ibe. 
8 Now, there was quite a bit of discussion addressed 
9 by you and Mr . Veeder and it is included among your points as 
10 to the rights that Mr. Walton may have received when he 
11 acquired the lands in 1948 which composed the three allot-
12 ments in the No Name Creek Valley. Now, the position of the 
13 United States on that point has been outlined in the briefs, 
14 and I will just paraphrase it, but we are a dopting Hibner, 
15 the rationale of Hibner, tofue extent that it holds that a 
16 successor to an allottee does get the right to the use of 
17 water to the extent that that water right was exercised by 
18 the Indian predecessor in interest at the time these lands 
19 departed from trust status. I think that is almost compelled 
20 by the language in u.s. v . Powers, where it alludes that 
11 there i s a right. It identifies-- I shouldn't say identi-
12 f ies -- it states there is some such right existing. It did 
23 not define the right or establish a standard to measure the 
24 right or how it came about, but it did say that there were 
25 such rights, in ref erring to, well, particularly to 381. 




1 The Government also says, well, based on that, 
2 Mr. Walton would have a right to share in the reserve water 
3 rights f or the Colville Tribe and its allottee to the extent 
4 that water rights were put to a beneficial use upon his 
5 three allotments during the period of its trust status. It 
6 would a l so, in our view, make those rights subject to the 
7 power and authority of the Secretary of the Interior to make 
8 a just and equal allocation of water among the Indians on 
9 the reservation, because I think it takes a very smal l jump 
10 and it's a matter that is constantly appearing in real 
11 estate l aw that you take subject to the rights that were 
12 already there. If the rights that were already there were 
13 subject to a power, in this case, as of the Secretary of the 
14 Interior, to control the allocation of waters i f necessary, 
15 then your rights to the use of those waters are controlled 
16 by that. 
17 Now, where the Government departs from Hibner, 
18 because Hibner was two-pronged, and Hibner said that, in 
19 addition to the rights that were being exercised by the 
20 Indian predecessor in interest at the time the land left 
11 trust, the successor would have a right to the use of water 
22 that he would put to a beneficial use within a reasonabl e 
23 time thereafter. It didn't define "reasonabl e time". Now, 
24 we believe that if, or I should say the United States' 
25 position on this is, if waters on the Walton allotments, for 




1 instance, were put to a beneficial use after the land left 
2 trust status, they would enjoy a right to the use of that 
3 water to the extent with a priority date of the date they 
4 were put to such beneficial use and to the extent that they 
5 were put to the beneficial use. The difference is the 
6 priority date. 
7 THE COURT: Why wouldn't that, if that analy-
8 sis is sound, why wouldn't that priority date go back to 1872 
9 MR. SWEENEY: Well, because, Your Honor, it 
10 would be inconsistent with the basic theory of reserved 
11 rights for Indians. In July of 1972 (sic), the Colville 
12 Reservation was reserved, along with its waters appurtenant 
13 thereto, f or the use of the Indians . If you extend the 
14 priority date of 1872 to use by a non-Indian after it had 
15 gone out of trust, you would be, really, going beyond the 
16 purpose for which the lands were reserved for the public 
17 domain to provide an abiding place for t he Indians, and it 
18 wou l d be inconsistent, Your Honor, in our view, to do that. 
19 Now, one of the difficulties in this particular 
20 case is the fact situation that we have concerning the 
21 devolution of the three Walton allotments out of trust status 
22 and through various conveyances into the ownership of Mr. 
23 Walton. As far as I can see, the record has nothing to shaw 
24 that there was any u se of water on these lands while these 
25 three a l lotments were in trust status, and they left trust 




1 status in the 1920's at various times . Testimony that I 
2 recall from Mr. Walton is that when he came and inspected 
3 the property in 1948 -- now, at that time it had been owned 
4 for a period of 20 or 25 years and been out of trust for a 
5 period of 25 years he said that there were about 32 acres 
6 of land that were being irrigated and he immediately applied 
7 for a state certificate to expand the amount of land that 
8 could be irrigated and received a water right, I think, of 
9 65 acres from the state, a certifi cate. But that, in 
10 particular, is the Government's position on the rights the 
11 Waltons succeeded to. 
12 Now, as to the Lahontan trout case, we take the 
13 position that, as Mr. Veeder said, there is no straitjacket 
14 on the rights or the uses to which the Indians can put water 
15 if they have a right to the use of such water. However, the 
16 reserved rights are limited by the uses to which the 
17 reservation was created. I don't believe, or we take the 
18 position that it is unreasonable to believe that the Colville 
19 Reservation was created and reserved from the public domain 
20 with an intention to provide a habitat for a non-indigenous 
21 fish. However, we do say that the Tribe, and its allottees, 
22 in its wisdom and in its discre·tion if it wishes can take 
23 waters, amount reserved, for these lands which were measured 
24 by the amount of waters necessary to irrigate the irrigated 
25 acreages and utilize a portion of those waters for such a 




1 fishery . 
1 Now, I would point out one thing about the Hill 
3 case , that it takes us out of the endangered- and threatened-
4 species thing. The Hill v. TVA specifically applies 16 
5 u.s .c. 1536 of the Endangered Species Act, and in that c ase , 
6 there was a specific finding by the Secretary of Interior 
1 that this particular stretch of whatever river it was was a 
8 critical- habitat area, and there is a specific regulation 
9 which sets forth the requirements for the establishment of 
10 critical habitat, and that has not been done here. I t hasn't 
11 been established under the regulation of the Secretary of 
11 Interior under that Act, that this is a particular critical-
13 habitat area. 
14 Now, the Court asked Mr . Veeder that, wouldn 't 
15 these lands --well, the issue you presented is whether, 
16 after the lands were reserved, and apparentl y the lands and 
17 the water appurtenant to the reservation were held in a 
11 communal situation, and then we had the Allotment Act, and 
19 lands were apportioned to individual Indians and thereafter 
10 were held by the United States in trust for a particular 
11 Indian and not for the tribe , wouldn't it render these lands 
11 valueless to the individual Indian during that period when 
13 that was available if those lands did not receive a right to 
14 share in these waters, and it is the position of the United 
15 States that the allottees did get that right to share the 




1 waters, and that that Indian a llottee had the right to convey 
2 his right to share in the waters to a non-Indian , for 
3 instance. However, when the non-Indian acquired those lands 
4 as to the water rights existing at that time, it would be 
5 subject to the requirements or strictures of 25 u.s.c. 381 . 
6 Now, the final issue, I think , is the authority to 
7 regulate the use of these waters as between the United States 
8 and the State of Washington. As pointed out in our brief, 
9 Your Honor, the State of Washington's right to control the 
10 use of water on land or control land appears, really, from 
11 the basic separation through the Desert Land Act , which 
12 refers to public land, and the state, when it becomes a state 
13 obtains the power and authority to regulate uses on lands and 
14 waters within those lands, subject to that statute, but the 
15 lands within the Colville Reservation were never sub ject to 
16 the Desert Land Act and never came under the jurisdiction of 
17 the state, and it was also set forth in the Enabling Act and 
11 in the Constitution of the State of Washington that it would 
19 not pertain to jurisdiction over Indian land, and even Public 
20 Law 280 does not pertain to water rights on Indian land. And 
21 finally, it would be an anomaly , indeed, if the state would 
22 be allowed to control the use of water , even by non-Indians, 
23 within the federal reservation or Indian land because all 
24 water rights are correlative , and that is perfectly set forth 
25 in 381, which speaks of the Secretary's power to make a just 




1 and equal allocation of water because when you are talking 
2 about a water right, you are talking about a water right as 
3 against someone else, a competing situation, and there should 
4 only be one entity to do that, and it is respectfully 
5 submitted that that entity is the Secretary of Interior in 
6 this case. 
1 That would conclude my remarks. 
8 THE COURT: All right . Before we start what 
9 amounts , I guess , to the opposition side of this, let's take 
10 the midmorning recess. Court will be in recess about 10 
11 minutes . 
12 MR. VEEDER: Your Honor, just one moment . Mr . 
13 Dellwo advises me that he has both of those opinions , and I 
14 have sent to his office to get them . 
15 
16 
11 10 minutes. 
THE COURT: Good . 
THE BAILIFF: This court stands at recess for 











1 THE COURT : Mr. Price, do you want to lead 
2 off, or do you want Mr. Roe or Mr. Mack, whoever is going 
3 to? 
4 MR. PRICE: Well, we have a little controversy 
5 in that regard, but I know I will be so confused by the time 
6 he is done that I would appreciate the privilege of going 




THE COURT: You may proceed, Mr. Price. 
MR. VEEDER: Does that go into the record? 
MR. PRICE: May it please the Court and 
II counsel, I would like to state, first off, that I am not a 
12 good contemporaneous speaker and I have some notes that I 
13 would like to allude to, but before I get into those, I would 
14 like to respond to some of the comments by Mr. Veeder and Mr. 
15 Sweeney. In addition, I should point out to the Court that I 
16 do not have access to a Telefax machine, nor do I have 
17 personal contact with anybody at the u.s. Supreme Court, 
11 which Mr . Roe will probably assert he does, nor do I have 
19 personal involvement in any other Indian water rights 
20 litigation that would give me an insight into the California 
21 and New Mexico cases handed down Monday, but I am undaunted 
22 in that I do have a newspaper clipping, about an inch by an 
23 inch, in which Charlie Roe is quoted as saying, "Based on 
24 these cases, the State will win every point in every case 
25 they are litigating with the federal government." 
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1 THE COURT: Mr. Roe is an eternal optimist. 
1 MR. PRICE: So, I will proceed forward on that 
3 basis . 
4 This case reminds me of the law school situation 
5 we were presented with, where six boys on an expedition were 
6 trapped in a cave. The rescuers found them, were able to 
7 make voice communication with them, and the engineers 
8 calculated that in the time that it would take to rescue the 
9 boys, there would not be sufficient air in the cave in which 
10 they were trapped for them all to survive. Thereupon, the 
II six boys elected to and it was also calculated by the 
11 engineers that five of them could survive in the time it 
13 would take to rescue them. The six trapped boys then set 
14 about in a plan by lot to sel ect one of them who would be 
15 disposed of, in hopes of the other five surviving. One boy 
16 was chosen, and he first agreed that he would be killed, and 
17 then, just at the moment that he was to be disposed of, he 
11 changed his mind and decided that wasn't a good idea after 
19 all. The other five boys went ahead with the plan and he was 
10 disposed of. The boys were rescued, and they were tried for 
21 murder. And the story has five opinions written by five 
12 different judges as to how they would handle that situation, 
13 in terms of, would the boys be convicted guilty of murder, 
24 or was there some overriding considerations that would exempt 
15 them from a conviction? 





1 I find this Court in no less of an enviable 
2 position in trying to decide the myriad of intricacies 
3 presented to you in this case. I also hope that the Court 
4 recognizes that it is no less easy for us counsel to try and 
5 come up with some answers to assis·t this Court in making a 
6 competent decision. And in that regard, I am not as sure of 
1 myself as Mr. Veeder. I don't count myself as lucky as him. 
8 I don't stand before you professing that the Walton's have 
9 an absolute right to all of the water to do anything they 
10 want with. This is a difficult case for the Waltons to come 
11 forward with. They have lived with the Indians . They have 
1% been raised with them. Our position is that we do have to 
13 share. I do not believe this world can any longer abide the 
14 position that it is all mine or it is all yours, and we are 
15 going to have it one way or another. We are all in this 
16 together, whether we be American Indians, Blacks, Irish or 
17 whatever, and I'm hopefu l that that is what separates this 
18 country from all other countries, that we have sets of laws 







promote justice, to try and enable human beings to live 
together in a just, equitable manner. 
With that understanding, the Waltons come before 
this Court asking to consider their arguments on the basis 
that this is not an all-or-nothing decision, that this Court 
can make a decision without legislating, without overlooking 





1 existing laws that will provide for the Indians and the 
2 Waltons to live together. 
3 Most importantly of all, it has become clearer and 
4 clearer to me that Mr . Veeder, and I believe his client, the 
5 Tribe, misperceive this case. We, the Waltons, are not 
6 attempting to take anything. This case is not about the 
7 Tribe losing anything or taking anything away from the 
8 Indians. This case is about Indians and about what they got, 
9 the manner in which they got it, and what they can do with it 
10 after they got it. I have argued from the beginning that we 
11 don ' t have the necessary parties here. I have argued from 
12 the beginning that we are really standing in the shoes of 
13 the allottees. I am arguing for the Indian allottee much 
14 more eo than I am for the Defendant Wal tons. It is their 
15 right. If they have no right, then the Defendant Waltons 
16 have no right. If the allottees have some rights, then the 
17 Defendant Waltons have some rights . 
11 The allot tees, I maintain, are not and never have 
19 been represented in this case. The Government says, "Well, 
20 we are here," but I call the Court's attention to the 
21 decision o f the Ninth Circuit in 1970 of the Scholder v. u.s., 
22 in which the court remanded the case back to the Ninth 
23 Circuit for adjudication of the allottee's interest, 
24 specifically pointing out that the case had been brought by 
25 the tribe, two tribes, that only their interest had been 




1 litigated, and that basically the allottees who might have 
1 an interest antagonistic to the tribes•, was not fully 
3 brought to the court's attention and should be factually 
4 tried out. This is even more important. It 's a technical-
5 ity and I will allude to it again, but all of the allottees 
6 in the allotments are not present before this Court. One of 
7 the exhibits presented to this Court was a lease by the 
8 Tribe of Allotment S-892. It was represented that all of the 
9 allottees• interests were involved in that lease. I reques~ 
10 of Mr. Veeder that he produce a title search showing that to 
11 be the case and the exhibit that has been introduced in that 
12 regard by the title office of the Colville Tribe shows there 
13 are six allottees• interests who are not represented, had 
14 not signed the lease on S-892 agreeing to the Tribe either 
15 using their land or involving them in a litigation package 
16 against the Waltons, and I will allude to that again later. 
17 There can be an equitable distribution of water in 
18 this case and I do not follow Mr. Veeder's reasoning that 
19 there cannot. If the allottees acquired a water right, then 
20 they conveyed that water right subject to watever restric-
21 tions the Government had placed on it, and the Government, 
12 through the Allotment Act, Section 381, had placed a 
23 restriction that if it was needed for irrigation and if there 
24 was a shortage of water, the Secretary of Interior would 
25 allocate the water equally. The Waltons took that restriction 




1 the same as the allottee did, and certainly they have to 
1 share in any shortage, just as any other Indian allottee 
i would. 
4 Counsel says he can find nowhere that we have 
5 offered that. Apparently he has not read the conclusion 
6 portion of my trial brief nor our Proposed Findings of Fact 
7 and Conclusions of Law, in which we specifically suggest 
8 this, and, in fact, in Exhibit H to my trial brief filed the 
9 first day of trial, we set out a specific chart of the 
10 various acreages and of the various waters that we feel the 
11 parties are entitled to, based on equitable distribution, 
11 based on Arizona v. California, of the practicable irrigable 
U acreage . 
14 Mr. Veeder alludes to the fact that Walton can't 
15 participate in this water because the reservation was 
16 reserved as an abiding place for the Indians to live for all 
17 time. It is the Defendant Walton ' s position that Congress 
18 may have had that intention at one time but certainly it 
19 changed it and modified that position with the enactment of 
10 the Dawes Act, when it saw fit to make Indians citizens, put 
11 them out on their awn to become American citizens, and to do 
11 that, give them a piece of the reservation and thereby take 
1) it away from all of the rest of the Indians as a communal 
24 group, and allow them to deal with it as their own . Whether 
15 to farm it or sell it was up to the individual Indian. It 




1 was no longer to be an abiding place for the individual 
2 Indian. It was to be up to him to do with it as he chose. 
J That is consistent with the principles upon which this 
4 country is based. We are interested with the individual . 
5 We do not place great emphasis on the community, on the 
6 government. We are interested in individual human beings. 
7 That is an a llottee, an individual Indian, and that is what 
8 we are trying in this case, and we can't lose sight of that. 
9 All of these principles about strict construction of statutes 
10 when it is in derogation of Indian interests have no place in 
11 this case . We are not derogating anything from the Indian, 
12 we are not taking anything, we are not proposing that this 
13 Court take anything . We are proposing that this Court 
14 acknowledge what Congress gave to the individual Indian, his 
15 chance, his capital investment to become an American citizen 
16 and to participate economically, which is the only way we 
17 have ever found that minority groups can ever become full-
11 fledged citizens, even though we may say they are citizens. 
19 Until they gain the economic ability to participate, it is 
20 only then that they can fully become and participate in the 
21 benefits that we have to offer. 
21 Mr . Veeder continues to refer to the fact that it 
23 is the Waltons who are drying up thi s valley and if Walton 
24 turns his pump on again, the Tribe will be without water. 
25 It is amazing to me haw Walton, who doesn't even have the 




1 capacity, mechanically, to pump that valley dry, who uses 
2 about a third of the water thatfue Tribe is using, is solely 
3 responsible for any alleged shortage of water in that valley. 
4 It is just incomprehensible to me. 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Price, under your theory of 
6 this case, if the record shows tha·t at the time the allottee 
7 made the original transfer to a non-Indian there had been 
8 no beneficial use of water and a non-Indian apparently at 
9 some subsequent time developed the 30 or 35 acres that I 
10 previously alluded to, is it your theory that Mr. Walton 
11 succeeded to the rights to those acres even though the Indian 
12 allottee had not developed them? 
u MR. PRICE: Yes, Your Honor. The allottee's 
14 interest, I am urging upon this Court, is as stated in the 
15 Powers case. It is vested but it is inchoate. Once it 
16 becomes vested, it doesn't leave. You don't lose it by non-
17 user. 
II Mr . Veeder, sometime in this case, alluded to the 
19 Ahtanum case, where, apparently under some agreement with the 
20 Secretary of Interior, non-Indians could under some situation 
21 lose the use of water if they do nat put it to use. That 
22 did not involve an interpretation of the Dawes Act and 
23 allottee's interest . In the Ahtanum case, the judge in that 
24 case specifically ruled the Class III defendants would 
25 participate with the Indians in the water on the reservation. 




1 It did not go further in defining that, but certainly that 
2 vested right is there. A vested right is not lost by laches, 
3 non-user, and it is there to be used when technology permits, 
4 when the state of agriculture or horticulture permits. 
5 In the 1920's, the Okanogan Vall ey consisted 
6 basically of sand and sagebrush. There were a few non-
7 Indian developments in the area. Any that were there were 
8 gravity- flow. There were no sprinklers, there were no pumps. 
9 The state of technology, agriculture, horticulture, develop-
10 ment in that area had not advanced to that state. It does 
11 not seem rational to me to claim that the Indian allot·tee, 
12 because he didn't use water while it was in trust status, 
13 lost the right to use it when it came out in fee patent to 
14 him, which, in fact, one of these allotments did. 
15 It is important to recognize that one of Walton's 
16 allotments was acquired in fee ownership by the original 
17 allottee. He had it in trust status first and then he was 
18 issued with patent with fee title. 
19 If Your Honor's statement were to be correct, 
20 then he, too, would lose any right to use water if he didn't 
21 irrigate immediately after acquiring the fee title status. 
ll I don't believe Congress intended that. I believe Congress 
23 intended just what it said: We are going to set the Indian 
24 apart as an individual; we are going to allow him to farm 
25 his land if he wants to; we are going to allow him to sell 




1 it and use the capital if he doesn't want to farm it. These 
2 specific words were used by the man who authored the Dawes 
3 Act,the General Allotment Act. 
4 So, my position is that this vested right is there 
5 and it is not Mr. Veeder seems to allude to the fact that 
6 if we allow non-Indians to use the water, that somehow, 
7 since non-Indians in this area normally would have developed 
8 horticultural and agricultural pursuits sooner than the 
9 Indian, all the water would be used up. That is not true. 
10 That is not our position. Our position is there is only 
11 so-much water on that reservation. There is only so- much 
12 water that can be allocated to each tract of land, and 
13 based on Arizona v. California, that is the practicable, 












year 2000, and say, by the way, I want to pump 3,000 acre 
feet, nor can an Indian allottee, but they can sit there 
and when they are ready to develop, develop to the extent 
of the practicable, irrigable acres in conjunction with othe 
Indians about them. 
If there is not enough water to meet that test --
practicable, irrigable acres -- then the water will be pro-
rated pursuant to Section 381, as Congress anticipated , and 
all parties will share, all parties will take a reduction, 
but all parties will have something to survive with. 
Mr . Veeder alleges that he has reviewed the record 




1 and on the appraisal, he can find that the Waltons or their 
1 predecessors do not support the fact that water went with 
3 this land . But attached to our trial brief and supplied by 
4 the United States Government pursuant to our interrogatories 
5 and request for production of documents are the actual 
6 posting of the land for sale , involving Allotment S-525, 
7 which is one of the Waltons• allotments, along with several 
8 other allotment properties being placed up for sale by the 
9 United States Government in January of 1925. 
10 In looking at that document, you find that S- 525, 
11 a hundred acres is offered for sale at $1,950, and I'm 
1.1 quoting, "about five acres of this land might be irrigated 
13 from the creek and 50 acres additional can be farmed, balance 
14 sui table for grazing". In 1925, all that was avail able was 
15 gravity flow. That is a hundred acres. 
16 We go down to the next allotment, 1 00 acres, and 
17 its price is $ 1 200, almost one and a-half times, or half 
18 again as many acres, and the price is $750 less . Obviously, 
19 somebody was placing an emphasis on the water with a hundred 
10 acres as increasing the price in the value of that land . 
21 This was posted for the public . The public read this 
22 notice. This is the basis on which they made their bid to 
23 buy the land . 
24 Harry George had 120 acres for sale, All otment 
25 S-865, for $1,000. That is more land than S-525, and yet 
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1 it is quite a bit lower in price, and if you go through this 
2 document, you find that, in fact, water was valued, and 
3 water was charged, and the price was based upon the recogni-
4 tion that at least the United States Government thought it 
5 was selling something of value, at least they were exacting 
6 or extracting from the purchaser of these allotments more 
7 money if water was involved. 
8 So, I take issue with Mr. Veeder's comment that 
9 there is nothing to support, in terms of appraisal, Walton ' s 
10 position, because I think with regard to the very allotment 
Jl involved here, we find that is not true. 
IZ I had asked for the postings of the appraisals on 
13 the other Walton allotments but the United States Government 
14 was not able to find such documents. 
15 With those remarks, responding to Mr. Veeder, I 
16 would then turn to my planned l ittle epistle here. 
17 With respect to the injunction, Your Honor, the 
II best I understand the Tribe's argument is that since they 
19 have a good chance of winning on the merits, you might as 
20 well enter the preliminary injunction at this time. And I 
21 don't say that sarcastically because that is a legitimate 
Z2 consideration for the Court, one of the four, in deciding 
23 whether or not to enter a preliminary injunction. 
24 We, of course, contest that . Only you can know 
25 where you stand on that at this time. 
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1 The second point is, will the Tribe suffer 
2 irreparable injury for which there is no adequate legal 
3 remedy. They have to come before this Court and shaw and 
4 substantiate that all egation in order to meet the require-
5 ments of a preliminary injunction. The answer to that is, 
6 "No.'' The Tribe has made no allegation that the school, the 
7 Paschal Sherman School, will close if this re l ief is not 
a granted . The only allegation is that the Paschal Sherman 
9 School is looking to the hay crop as supplemental income . 
10 Supplemental income does not constitute irreparable injury 
11 f or which there is no adequate remedy at law. Obviously, 
12 that speaks strictly to monetary damages, and it is not 
13 something that an injunction would speak to . 
14 As for the Lahontan fishery, it has existed and 
15 thri ved for 10 years prior to coming here today for you to 
16 hear about the crisis that if they don ' t get water tomorrow, 
17 something dastardly is going to happen. That fishery has 
11 survived, not only survived but thrived for 10 years without 
19 any developed water from the upper a llotments being pumped 
20 down that creek. I suggest, Your Honor, they are probably 
21 going to survi ve two more months and probably survive two 
lZ more years. 
23 THE COURT: Isn't there a changed condition 
24 in that 10-year period? During that period the Indians were 
25 not irrigating the irrigable acres, and, therefore, there was 




1 water going down for the use of the fish. 
2 MR. PRICE: There has always been some water 
3 going dawn, Your Honor. The point is, the fish couldn't 
4 utilize it even if there was water. There was no channel 
5 for them. It was a swampy area. It wasn't until the Tribe 
6 in 1976 or '77 went in at great expense and built an actual 
7 channel. They put tarp, a black plastic, down. They put 
8 board sides on a channel for some distance where they al l ow, 
9 make it feasible for these fish to come into the stream. It 
10 wasn't even feasible for them t·o get in there. The fish are 
11 propagated by c atching them, taking them to the hatchery, 
12 the spawners, and the fingerlings are raised there and then 
13 brought back to the lake. The expert testimony by the Tribe 
14 is that this practice will continue whether or not the 
15 fishery in No Name creek turns out to be a practical or 
16 successful maneuver. But, obviously, there is nothing 
17 endangering the Lahontan fishery in terms of whether that 
18 water is shut off tomorrow. Some newborn fish in the stream 
19 may die. But the fishery, the Lahontan fishery, will not be 
20 threatened, its existence in Ornak Lake, nor will it be 
21 killed. It will continue to survive as they have again this 
22 year , are raising the fingerlings in the hatchery, the 
23 federal hatchery at Winthrop, just as they always have, and 
24 those will be available to the lake. 
25 As I understand the expert testimony with respect 




1 to the fishery , it is that, by artificially structuring the 
2 stream channel to allow the fish to naturally spawn, there 
3 might be some strengthening of the species over a number of 
4 years. They might grow a little bigger; they might be a 
5 little hardier stock, but that is the most that I ' m aware of 
6 in that regard. 
7 Again, this is not something that demands the 
a Court's attention in terms of a preliminary injunction. 
9 The third item is that others must not suffer 
10 adverse effects as a consequence of the injunction. 
11 The uncontested and unrebutted testimony is to the 
1% effect that if a preliminary injunction is granted, the 
13 Defendant Walton will be out of business, and their business 
14 is the sole means of their livelihood. Without qualification 
15 I suggest to the Court that at most the loss of a few bales 
16 of hay, if that even occurs, the loss of one of the parties' 
17 livelihood so outweighs the loss of a few bales of hay that 
11 the preliminary injunction should not be granted. 
19 The four t h item that the Court might consider is 
%0 whether or not the granting of a preliminary injunction 
11 would be in furtherance of the public interest. 
%% I do not believe that this is a public-interest 
%3 case that the courts have in mind. I would suggest the 
14 situation of maybe the construction of a nuclear plant in 
25 downtown Spokane could have potential adverse effects of 




1 injuring hundreds of thousands of people if something goes 
2 wrong, if the type of situation where the public's interest 
3 might be of paramount interest, such as the Court would be 
4 compelled to grant a preliminary injunction. 
5 This is basically a private litigation between 
6 two parties. It does not bring into play the public interest 
7 even though the case itself may be of public interest. It 
8 is not the type where a preliminary injunction is needed to 
9 protect the public interest. 
10 On these bases, we believe the Tribe fails to meet 
11 the requirements, the legal requirements, of a preliminary 
12 injunction and that the ultimate question should be decided 
13 without the devastating effect of entering a preliminary 
14 injunction with regard to the Defendants Walton at this 
15 time. 
16 THE COURT: Mr. Roe. 
17 MR. PRICE: Charlie, i f you could just give 
11 me --
19 THE COURT: Oh, excuse me, I'm sorry. 
20 MR. PRICE: I hate to say this, Your Honor, 
21 but I'm just getting started. 
22 THE COURT: All right. I might at this time 
23 advise counsel, maybe you already know, that I have a 
24 naturalization proceeding at 1:30, and so at noon I'm going 
25 to recess the arguments in this case until 2:30, while I go 




1 in the other courtroom and take care of the naturalization 
2 matter, so I'm not trying to put any time limit on you. 
3 MR. PRICE: All right. Thank you, Your Honor. 
4 In reading through the myriad of cases respecting 
5 Indian law , on the subject of Indian law, it is difficult and 
6 seems to me sometimes impossible to try and make sense of the 
7 swings in the courts' position when one week we wil l read of 
8 a decision that apparently upholds tribal sovereignty above 
9 all else , and then in the next week the u.s. Supreme Court 
10 will come down with a decision that says the tribe cannot 
11 prosecute non-Indians on the reservation and have no rights 
12 with respect to non-Indians on their lands. But I think 
13 there is a thread, there is a theme that runs through these 
14 cases, and the basis of the Tribe's argument is sovereignty. 
15 They are sovereign, and they have power to regul ate the 
16 water on that reservation. I think the courts do acknowledge 
17 that any Indian tribe has certain vestiges of sovereignty, 
18 not total. I think we all agree , and Mr. Veeder will have 
19 to agree, that ultimately Congress, the United States , is 
20 the paramount authority, even with respect to divesting the 
21 Indians entirely of any rights, if Congress so chooses. 
22 But the thread that I find is that when the 
23 Indians are dealing with themselves, controlling their own 
24 affairs, zoning, inheritances, the tribal sovereignty will 
25 prevail, even to the exclusion of what we would consider the 
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1 denial of constitutional rights to certain Indians on the 
2 reservation, but when the Supreme Court has to take a look 
3 at the Indians vis - a - vis a non-Indian, the Court refuses to 
4 throw out the Constitution and say tribal sovereignty is 
5 going to prevail. 
6 We are dealing with a case , not of internal tribal 
1 regulation, but of t ribal regulation and non-Indian interest , 
a which are directl y together, and in that case I thi nk it is 
9 important that we find, distinguish, that we don't take one 
10 case that says tribal sovereignty should prevail and try to 
11 apply it in every other case . 
12 The judge in the Confederated Salish and Kootenai 
Tribes forgive me for the mispronunciation if there is 
14 one -- in the u.s. District Court in Montana, I thought, 
15 spoke to this issue and spoke very well. 
16 He cited -- he referred to the Tribes' reference 
17 to the McClanahan v . Arizona State Tax Commis~on case, in 
18 which the Tribe was alleging that tribal sovereignty, based 
19 on that case, should prevail over all else. That case 
20 involved the Indians' attempts to have the non-Indians remove 
21 their wharves from Flathead Lake in Montana, claiming that 
22 they acquired no such right as successors to allottees or 
23 as homesteaders. 
24 In citing the McClanahan case for the proposition 
25 of sovereignty of the Tribe, the Court stated as follows: 











"The Court cannot agree . In the complex and some-
times uncertain area of Indian law, care must be 
exercised in attempting to apply language used in 
one factual situation in a totally different 
context. McClanahan was concerned with the rights 
of a state to impose a tax on income earned by an 
Indian on a reservation. Here , we are concerned 
a with the rights of both individual India ns and 
9 their non- Indian grantees under grants by the 
10 federal government pursuant to congressional 
11 action . " 
12 I find a great deal of analogy in the judge's 
13 reasoning there, and how applicable, it seems to me, it 
14 should apply in this case. 
15 The Colville Confederated Tribes and the United 
16 States of America have initiated this action seeking relief 
17 in the form of an injunction . The crux of the Plaintiffs 
11 Tribes ' case is that there is a shortage of water for a ll 
19 of the desired u ses in t he No Name Creek Valley , and that 
20 the entire cost of the shortage can be laid at the Defendant 
21 Waltons• feet . 
21 I would like to preface the rest of my remarks 
23 with the admonition that one seeking equity must do equity. 
24 To do equity in this case would require of this Court that 
25 the total water resources available to the land included 




1 within the No Name Creek Valley be considered and evaluated. 
2 This was not done, and it was not done because the plaintiff 
3 was successful in limiting the Testing Order of July 24, and 
4 as amended, from collecting and evaluating any resource data 
5 below the granite lip. 
6 We came before this Court some years ago for the 
7 Testing Order involved. Defendant Waltons asked that the 
8 Testing Order include the area below the granite lip. That 
9 was not included, however, because the Tribe objected. 
10 However, this Court, in effect, by doing that, has excluded 
11 if I may approach the exhibit, Your Honor -- 46 percent 
12 of the entire water basin, as exhibited in one of the 
13 plaintiffs' exhibits. 46 percent of the drainage basin has 
14 been excluded from consideration as being a potential and 
15 available water resource for the lands in question . 
16 My point is, if we are going to consider 901 and 
17 903 lands that are included within that drainage basin, why 
18 are we not including the waters that arise there? 
19 The Defendants Waltons put on testimony from Mr. 
20 Maddox, from Mr. Hampson, and from Defendant Walton himself, 
11 that there are waters which arise on the surface and are 
22 obviously loc a ted underground within that portion of the 
Z3 drainage basin. Even the Tribes' exhibits show that they 
14 consider that an aquifer, a portion of that as an aquifer, 
15 as opposed to an aquiclude, and this is highlighted on their 




1 colored exhibits. 
2 I'm suggesting that that is not equitable. What 
3 is equitable about allowing the Tribes, through their legal 
4 counsel, to dictate to their expert witnesses, the fact-
5 finders, if you will, just what facts they could find and 
6 what they couldn't find; and I would like to refer to the 
7 transcript in that regard, Your Honor. 
8 Mr. Mack's questioning of Mr. Watson. This is at 

















"A We are dealing with a very small basin, 
and the Omak Creek and the No Name Creek basins 
are totally separate except to the extent that 
water is contributed naturally from the Omak 
Creek to the No Name Creek Basin. 
"Q And are they separate based on your view 
as a hydrologist, without any other consideration, 
or are they separate based on your view as a 
hydrologist pursuant to the tribal resolution 
which you have described? 
"A Those are my orders, Mr. Mack. 
"Q Pardon me? Would you repeat that? 
"A I'm operating under the resolution of the 
Colville Confederated Tribes. I'm operating 
under the di rec·tion of Mr. Corke, and the Col villes 
have decided that Omak Creek is a separate watershed 




1 and that artificial induction of water from that 
creek to the No Name Creek basin is not what 
3 they like. It is not what they desire." 
4 I'm suggesting, Your Honor, that in a case of 
5 equity, it seems inequitable to me to allow one of the 
6 parties to dictate exactly what the fact-finders should be 
7 finding if they intend to do equity themselves. 
8 The inequity of the situation seems to me to be 
9 highlighted by the fact that prior to Mr. Veeder's becoming 
10 actively involved in this litigation, the Tribe entered into 
11 an agreement with the Defendant Waltons in which he actually 
12 granted them easement to divert surface water from Omak 
13 Creek down through the No Name Creek channel, and this was 
14 done for an entire year, where the Tribe put to beneficial 
15 use that water in connection with their Lahontan fishery. 
16 If the Tribe can find it beneficially useful to 
17 divert the surface waters at one time, but then for purposes 
11 of a litigation package against the Defendant Waltons , pass 
19 a resolution that they find that it isn't to their best 
20 interest to use that water for purposes of that litigation, 
21 I believe that we have allowed inequities to creep into the 
22 case to the extent that they are detrimental and prejudicial 
23 to the Defendant Waltons . 
24 In other words, I would like to analogize it to 
25 the fact that, basically, we have a water spigot in the 




1 No Name Creek Valley . We can have as much or as little water 
2 as you need. A water shortage can be created by turning t he 
3 spigot dawn . In other words, by not putting your pumps as 
4 law as they might otherwise go. Or you can have plenty of 
5 water if you want to divert from Omak surface flow. 
6 I find the Court in a difficult position when it is 
7 being asked to do equity when one of the parties litigating 
8 is actually control ling and manipulating the water that is 
9 in question in this case . 
10 Plaintiffs' own expert witnesses-- before I pass 
11 on to this next point, I want to add to this equitable 
12 consideration again and refer to the fact that our offer of 
13 proof from hydrologist Fred Jones who , on his offer of 
14 proof, testified that the surface waters from Omak creek, 
15 without detracting from other beneficial users, could be 
16 employed to meet all of the needs within No Name Creek 
17 Valley, minimum and maximum. I have gone back over his 
18 offer of proof. I tried it three different times and in 
19 three different p l aces he says the same thing. I think Mr. 
20 Jones, it is interesting in that he was hired by the United 
21 States Government to do his fact-finding and his research to 
22 see what he c ould come up with and this is one of the matters 
23 that he felt important, that he felt was applicable to this 
24 case, and then after his findings were calculated, the 
25 Government found, for one reason or another, that it would 




1 not benefit them to put that material in evidence and so 
1 the Defendant Waltons attempted to elicit that information . 
3 I believe it becomes important again when the Court recog-
4 nizes that we are here to do equity . 
5 Again, in 1975 the Tribe put an exhibit into 
6 evidence that indicated that Walton's use, in fact, I believe 
1 we have it up before you right now, Your Honor -- again , if 
a I may approach the exhibit, just to refer to the number 
9 25-C, it shows that in 1975 Walton was the only user of 
10 water for beneficial application, and that his use for his 
11 entire consumptive needs, irrigation and domestic, barely 
11 even made a ripple in that chart in terms of the amount that 
13 the aquifer was affected, barely even made a ripple, and 
14 that the aquifer fully recovered prior to commencement of 
15 the ' 76 irrigation season without any trouble whatsoever 
16 because basically it hadn't even been tapped. 
17 Then in 1976, we start to see more precipitous 
11 declines. I come back to Mr . Veeder's again. I still to 
19 this day don't understand how Mr . Walton can be responsible 
10 for precipitous declines in '76 and '77 when their own 
21 exhibit shows that his use of water makes no dent in the 
21 aquifer whatsoever . If there is a precipitous decline , it 
23 is obvious from the facts the Tribe has presented \'oh o is 
24 the cause of that precipitous decline, and if the Tribe 
15 wants to pump themselves out of water, I would suggest to 




1 this Court they are probably capable of doing it. I do not 
2 think that lays any fault at the feet of Mr. Walton . The 
3 Plaintiff Tribe, Your Honor, argues at some length that it 
4 is federal law which should control,not state law. Defendant 
5 Waltons concur in part with that and we set out in some 
6 length in our brief, from pages 23 through 31, that, indeed, 
7 it is federal law which we are attempting to interpret and 
a apply in this situation. 
9 There is an important distinction, however, between 
10 Mr. Walton and the Tribe. Although we recognize certain 
11 vestiges of sovereignty with respect to a tribe's dealing 
12 with its members within its property, that sovereignty cannot 
13 overlap and conflict with a federal policy which has 
14 specifically dealt with property formerly part of an Indian 
15 reservation, including the appurtenant water rights. The 
16 federal government has the power and right to manage and 
17 even divest the Indians of land and water to the extent 
11 Congress sees fit . 
19 With that power in mind, Congress specifically 
10 undertook, in 1887, by means of the General Allotment Act, 
21 to terminate Indian reservations as such and transform the 
22 Indians' property rights from a communal holding to an 
13 individual private ownership. The legislative history and 
14 acts subsequent thereto are indicative of this clear intent 
25 on the part of Congress. 




























Representative Skinner expressed the typical 
attitude and sense of concern in this excerpt from the House 
debate of the bill in late 1866, and I quoted from that in 
our brief, and I would like to quote from some of the legis-
lators who, in 1885, 1886 and 1887, were the men who actually 
drafted, were the movers behind the General Allotment Act, 
to get a sense of what they were about. 
"These were hard times for the Indians. There is 
no question but that the white man was set about 
developing this land, occupying every last inch 
of it." 
There were a few men in Congress out to protect those 
I ndians, and they thought they were doing a good job. 
Representative Skinner: 
"Mr. Chairman , from the beginning of our existence 
as a nation, the Indian has been the subject of 
national legislation, but at no time so much as 
now has there been such a pressing necessity for 
the adoption of a general Indian policy, the 
enactment o f some measure that will lead to a 
correct solution of the Indian problem. As long 
as the Great West remamed unoccupied or sparsely 
settled by the white man, and abounded with gam~, 
the India n retired before the advancing civiliza-
tion of the white man and subsisted by the chase. 
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But now, the white civilization of the East has 
been met by the white civilization from the West. 
The game has been destroyed, the food supply from 
that source is gone from the Indian, gone forever. 
This being a true statement of the situation, the 
Indian must either perish, depend on the govern-
ment for support, or abandon his thriftless habits 
and learn to e at bread in the sweat of his face 
and finally rise to the level of the civilization 
that surrounds him and take upon himself the 
duties and responsibilities of American citizen-
ship. Starvation, pauperism or independent, self-
supporting citizenship, between these, the Indian 
must take his choice, or rather we, as guardians, 
must choose for him." 
Congress, again , is recognizing that it is making 
17 the choices. There is no question about it. The Indian was 
18 not left with a choice. We, as white Amer±cans controlling 
19 the government, were making the decisions for the Indian 
20 and still today do that. 
21 With respect to the General Allotment Act, 
22 Congress understood that it was about to change the manner 
23 with which it was dealing with Indians. Up until then, 
24 there had been communal holdings. The Indian had been 
25 dealt with as a group, but now Congress is about something 















The words of Representative Perkins: 
"In the judgment of the great mass of American people, 
the time has come when the policy of keeping Indians 
in their tribal organizations and restraining and 
controlling them by bayonets and shotguns must be 
abandoned, and a new era ina~gurated, an era of educa-
tion, an era in which they shall be enabled and 
required to qualify themselves for the duties of 
American citizenship and to support themselve$ by 
industry and toil. That is the spirit and object of 
12 this bill." 
13 This "bill" being the General Allotment Act. 
14 The Plaintiff Tribe would have this Court believe 
15 that although land was patented in fee for use and benefit 
16 of individual Indians, that the appurtenance of water some-
17 how magically remained with the Tribe, apart from the land, 
18 to be administered and used by a nonexistent tribal govern-
19 ment. 
20 One of my quotes in here that I passed over to 
21 save some time is a lengthy speech in which the tribal 
22 governments are castigated, the tribes are not spoken highly 
23 of, and whether or not that was a fact, Congress thought it 
24 was a fact, and Congress took that into consideration in 
25 passing the General Allotment Act. 




1 The Plaintiff Tribe highligh ts this position at 
2 page 10 of their summation which they have submitted to 
3 this Court where they cite time and time again the Court's 
4 admonition that, how could Congres s give the Indians the 
5 land and withhold from them the water that was necessary to 
6 make that land valuable? That admonition is no less 
7 persuasive in terms of the General Al l otment Act when 
8 Congress was attempting to divide up that land and give it 
9 to the individual Indians. If Congress was so instilled and 
10 imbued with the idea that the Indian had to have water , does 
11 it really make sense to believe that in their attempt to 
12 save the Indian , they were going to give him individual 
13 tracts of land and then leave the water to a nonexistent 
14 tribal government? -- a nonexistent tribal government that , 
15 if it did exist, according to Congress, was being misadmin-
16 istered infuvor of the tribal chiefs, and the individuals 
17 were getting left out anyway. 
18 Why , if the press of the white man was taking 
19 every piece of land the Indians had , why would Congress 
20 leave the water rights up for grabs and not give it to the 
21 individual allottee? The purpose behind the Dawes Act was 
22 to allow the Indian as an individual to have rights of 
23 c i tizenship and take his land into court and protect it, if 
24 need be . He couldn't do that as a member of a tribal 
25 community . He had no right, no standing. As an owner of 




1 land under the General Allotment Act, he could. What good 
2 does it do for him to go into court and protect and save 
3 his land if some irrigation company is out there and already 
4 acquired the water rights through an act of Congress, which 
5 is exactly what Senator Dawes, Senator Perkins and a l l of the 
6 other senators who were promoting t he General Allotment Act 
7 saw as happening if they didn't act to protect the Indian. 
8 Congress, b y means of the Dawes Act, was attempting 
9 to protect Indian property rights. To have transferred the 
10 land without appurtenant water would have left the most 
11 important aspect up for grabs by non-Indians and tribal 
12 chiefs, from whom Congress was attempting to protect the 
13 individual Indians in the f irst p l ace. 
14 It is impossible to believe that in transmitting 
15 the property to private ownership, that the desert lands 
16 would be conveyed withcut water, which is essential to the 
17 life of the Indian and the crops he or she raised. 
18 Congress intended that, when the land had been 
19 conveyed to each man, woman and child on the reservation , 
10 that there would be no tribe left, and the u.s. Government 
11 would be totally free of admi nistration of any Indian 
11 affairs, as t here would be no tribe and no reservation left 
13 to administer. The i ndividual Indians would be citizens of 
14 the u.s. with property the same as any other citizen. 
1$ In quoting from Senator Dawes again, in a speech 
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to Congress prior to passage of this Act; 
2 "If you make the Indian a self-supporting citizen of 
3 the United States, all these things disappear of 
4 themselves. When that time comes , there can be no 
5 reservation to abolish or perpetuate, no Indian agent 
6 to appoint or dismiss, no treaty to keep or abrogate. 
7 The work is accomplished when the Indian has become 
8 one of us, absorbed into the body politic, a self-
9 supporting citizen, and nothing is left of the ques-
10 tions that are troubling us, and if he becomes a 
11 citizen, then all of the machinery disappears like an 
12 April cloud before the sunrise." 
13 It is obvious that Senator Dawes was a little 
14 more optimistic than history has proven him out, but the 
15 import, the significance of Senator Dawes' statements, of 
16 the author of the General Allotment Act, is that they were 
17 getting out of the Indian business. If they were getting 
18 out of the Indian business, how can we believe Congress was 
19 going to leave some tribal government administering water 
20 rights? Congress would accomplish nothing to get out of the 
21 Indian business and still have itself or I ndian tribes 
22 administering the water without which the land was useless. 
23 Obvious l y, this transition would involve some 
24 competing use of water for irrigation purposes and to the 
25 extent that occurred, Congress had the foresight to provide 




1 that some entity would have the power to administer in such 
2 situations. Obviously, the Tribe was not the appropriate 
3 entity, as in most instances, as far as Congress was 
4 concerned at that time, there was no central form of govern-
5 ment amongst tribes, and in those cases where some form of 
6 government did exist, Congress felt the interests of the 
7 tribal chiefs were many times at odds with the best interests 
8 of the individual members of the tribe . 
9 I t is interesting to note in reading the history 
10 of the various bands and tribes making up the Colville 
11 Indian Reservation that at the time and after the passage of 
12 the General Allotment Act in 1887, t hese tribes and bands 
13 were still warring with one another, actually perpetrating 
14 war on each other . Are we to bel ieve that some one of those 
15 bands was going to control and administer water? That the 
16 Lake Band was going to tell the Okanogan Band whether they 
17 could have water or couldn't have water? Were the Nez Perce 
18 members goi ng to tell the Okanogan group what water they 
19 could and couldn ' t have? I think it is unrealistic to assume 
20 that the various tribes in that reservation were going to 
21 put up with such an administration, much less Congress. 
22 Section 381 of the Dawes Act was an attempt to 
23 provide an administration of competing property rights, but 
24 in no way does it attempt to withhold the property right of 
2$ water or reserv e it in any manner for administration by a 




1 nonexistent tribal government . 
2 Section 381 was no different than the section in 
3 the General Allotment Act that calls for the Secretary to 
4 administer and carry out, effectuate, the General Allotment 
5 Act, have it surveyed, have the individual Indians make 
6 application, get the work done. Section 381 was an 
7 administrative act, and it does not in any manner withhold 
8 or speak to withholding any rights to the Tribe, as opposed 
9 to a llowing the water to vest in the allottee. 
10 Certainly the Secretary of the Interior cannot act 
11 to allocate water unequally among the allottees, and we 
12 cited ·the cases in our brief on behalf of that proposition, 
13 in, basically, u.s. v. Powers. And Felix Cohen, the prophet, 
14 if you will, of Indian water law, subscribed to that posi-
15 tion. 
16 If the Secretary of the Interior cannot act to 
17 distribute the water unequally, neither can the Tribe. That 
18 is why I persist in my argument on behal f of the Waltons 
19 that the necessary parties are not present in this case. 
20 The Tribe has asserted that it is entitled to 
21 initiate and administer a water code, not on its lands 
22 acquired in 1956. Well, let me put this another way. 
23 The Tribe, back in 1901, ceded all of its l ands, 
24 even the diminished south half of the reservation, back to 
25 the United States Government. Mr. Veeder says, "Show me, 




1 Mr. Price. Show me, Defendant Waltons , where the water ever 
2 went out of the Tribe." Well, I call his attention to the 
3 Act which he put into evidence, which we are all familiar 
4 with, the McLaughlin Act, or Agreement, in which the 
5 President sent out McLaughlin, and he obtained an agreement 
6 from the Indians by which they ceded all of the lands back 
7 to the United States Government. This agreement was never 
8 ratified by Congress, but it was adopted almost word-for-word 
9 verbatim in the 1906 Act, and the United States Supreme Court 
10 has had occasion to speak to that exact situation, where 
11 McLaughlin obtained an agreement from another tribe, the 
12 Rosebud Sioux Tribe. It was never ratified by Congress, but 
13 Congress enacted an act which incorporated the pertinent 
14 l anguage and the u.s. Supreme Court said it was done, it was 
15 effectuated. So, yes, title did move out of the Tribe, and 
16 it didn't come back until 1956. 
17 The Colville Tribe did not, under the Howard-
18 Wheeler Act, incorporate, and did not choose to i ncorporate, 
19 back in the 1930's, under the Wheeler-Howard Act, but in 
20 1 956, instead, the United States Government conveyed back 
21 the lands that had been ceded to it, and when the United 
22 States Government did that, it did it subject, the termino-
23 logy is: "Subject to all existing and valid rights". 
24 Congress understood, realized something had moved 
2$ away from the Tribe during that intervening period, between 







the period of the General Allotment Act and the time when 
the Tribe reacquired the property in 1956 . 
The Tribe hasn't lost anything. They can go out 
4 and control any water they want on their lands. On their 





















Indians who have rights. 
When Congress conveyed back the land to the Indians 
in 1956, it a lso provided in that very same statute that 
money would be appropriated for Congress to purchase water , 
water rights and other lands, for the Tribe. 
If Congress didn't recognize that something had 
moved away from the Tribe , then why provide for the buying 
of it back? 
I believe that it's - - some I ndian allottee, if 
this Court were to rule in the Tribe's favor, is going to 
get a real rude awakening someday if he is presented with a 
tribal water code which, if I read it correctly, listed a 
p~iority for fishing as a top priority, with irrigation 
somewhere down the line, and if the Tribe comes by and says, 
"Pardon me, Mr. Indian Allottee, we have need for that water 
for a fishing program, and you may not use it for irriga-
tion," and, based on a decision in this case in which, 
purportedly, that Indian a llottee's interest is represented, 
I think he would find it very surprising indeed. 
Again, I assert that it is the Indian allottee's 




1 interest we are litigating here, and to the extent that the 
2 Tribe is trying to promote a water code which is inconsis-
3 tent with those individual allottees' rights, this Court 
4 does not have the necessary parties. 
5 The Tribe is asking this Court to enunciate 
6 principles affecting almost every major body of water west 
7 of the Mississippi. The fact that it has those ramifica-
8 tions doesn't mean the Court can back away from a decision, 
9 but I emphasize again the importance of that decision, I 
10 think, requires necessary parties. I think allottees are 
, 1 necessary parties to that type of a decision. 
12 I have previously called your attention to the 
13 technical defect, what I consider a technical defect in title 
14 to Allotment S-892, which is the allotment immediately north 
15 of the Defendant Waltons'., of the six non-signators to the 
16 Tribe's agreement. If an injunction were granted and the 
17 Tribe were allowed to pump water from 892 down to Allotments 
18 901 and 903, what of the interests of those unrepresented 
19 interests in 892 who may say, by the way, Tribe, that is our 
20 water, we don't want it going to 901 and 903 . We want it 
21 used on our land, and if there has to be any proration of 
22 water, we are entitled to that water, not 901 and 903 . 
23 These are some questions that I think are not mere techni-
24 calities but are glaring, in terms of the Court considering 
25 granting what the Tribe is asking for. 




1 I alluded to the Scholder v. United States, 1970 
2 Ninth Circuit case, and I will quote briefly from it: 
3 "We remand this phase of this case to the District 
4 Court for determination of t he validity of the charges ~ " 
5 Some charges in connection with an irrigation project. 
6 "The issue was not fully examined below, in part 
1 because those appellants who had a day in court, the 
8 Pala and Rincon Bands, did not emphasize this aspect 
9 of the case. Undoubtedly, the issue is of more concern 
10 to the individual allotment holder than it is to the 
11 bands. The issue was not fully briefed before this 
12 court. The appellees failed to direct our attention 
13 to any authorization for the imposition of the charges , 
14 pointing instead to statutes authorizing the assess-
15 ment of the construction charges." 
16 The Tribe isn't emphasizing its right to adopt a 
11 water code in derogation of the rights of all ottees, and I 
18 do not believe I have seen the United States Government 
19 resisting, on behalf of the allottees, any such assertion. 
20 The Tribe claims they are attempting to fill a 
21 void. Mr . Tonasket, Council Chairman, as a witness before 
22 this Court, got up here and said, "We asked the government 
23 to act." It was a plaintiful·' _ plea. I agree. "We have 
24 asked the government to act. We need to fill a void." 
15 There is some·thing wrong with that , however. It is not 




1 attempting to fill a void, Your Honor. They are attempting 
2 to usurp power. They can control the waters on their lands 
3 that the Tribe owns. They can adopt a water code with 
4 respect to those waters, but they have to respect the rights 
5 of the allottees and the successors. They have not done 
6 that in their code, and until the Secretary of Interior 
7 acts, it cannot be done. 
8 There is before this Court an affidavit from the 
9 Secretary of Interior, Secretary Cecil Andrus, stating that 
10 he is working, promulgating rules and regulations that 
11 apparently woul d speak to some of the issues involved in 
12 this case . I find it difficult that , with such important 
13 and grave consequences , that this case could carry, that, 
14 pending the adoption of those rules and regulations, that 
15 the Court could give any credence to the Tribe's water code 
16 or a decision that might run contrary to those rules and 
17 regulations. 
18 I 'm not so sure I even want him to promulgate 
19 rules and regulations because they may be adverse to my 
20 client, but in all practicality, I have to look ahead to 
21 what some court might do and suggest , and with an important 
22 part of the case pending, in limbo with an affidavit from 
23 the Secretary of the Interior that he is acting with all 
24 due speed to try and resolve the Tribe's allegation of a 
2$ void , I think possibly some consideration should be given 




1 to that area. 
2 Our argument, as I have stated before, is not 
3 anti-Indian, or anti-Tribe. I think, in the last issue of 
4 the Colville Indian Tribune I don't have the name exactl y 
5 correct -- in referring to this trial, I and t he Defendant 
6 Wa ltons are referred to as the "bad guys". I think it' s 
7 important that the Plaintiff Tribe and the United States 
8 Government, as well as the Defendant Waltons, recognize that 
9 there are no bad guys or good guys in this litigation. We 
10 are all here with legitimate interests, attempting to work 
11 together in a civil form, to resolve what differences we 
12 have. I think the Plaintiff Tribe, if they would give more 
13 attentionm the matter, woul d see that there is just as much 
14 need for the a llottees' interest in this case as there is 
15 their own, because when this case is all said and done, t hey 
16 return to being individual Indians again, not just tribal 
17 members trying to fight a case , a unified case against a 
18 non-Indian, but they become individual members again, with 
19 their own interests, about what water rights do they have 
20 with res pect to each other, and that issue is before this 
21 Court through Defendant Waltons. The true party in 
22 interest, the a llottee, is not here. 
23 Your Honor, there is a given amount of water on 
24 fuat reservation . The Wal tons can ' t usurp more than their 
25 share, nor can anybody. It is not a question of waiting 
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1 a reasonable time or when is the water going to be put to 
2 use. There are practicable, irrigable acres which can be 
3 mea sured and calculated. There is a given amount of water, 
4 which c an be c a lculated, and it can be applied to the lands 
5 and if there is a need for allocation, we have the means to 
6 do it. 
7 In terms of the water availability and water duty, 
8 I would not be accurate if I didn•t say I questioned the 
9 Tribe's experts, in ·terms of their 550· acre feet. It is 
10 interesting that it is exactly the same figure that the 
11 Tribe placed in a proposed pretrial order a year before the 
12 measurements were actually made that enabled them to 
13 calculate their so-called 550 acre feet firm annual water 
14 supply. I also question it because they had a goal in mind. 
15 I do not question the United States Geological Survey. I 
16 believe they made an honest attempt without any goals given 
17 to them, any orders or directions other than to measure and 
18 quantify the water that was available, and my best recollec-
19 tion is tha·t there was competent testimony of 1100 acre feet 
20 available on an ongoing basis. Mr. Maddox testified on 
21 behalf of the Waltons that there might be more than that. 
22 I would prefer to rely on the United States Geological 
23 Survey testimony in this case, in that Mr. Maddox's testi-
24 mony, to me, was basically for the purpose of corroborating, 
25 testifyin g to the accuracy and the ability of the United 




1 States Geological Survey, rather than his having done all 
2 of the measurements himself . 
3 Based on the 1100 acre feet of water available, 
4 I have a chart which I would like to hand to Your Honor, and 
5 to all of counsel, that would just assist me in running 
6 through my argument a little quicker, if I might, Your Honor. 
7 We have used the Tribe's figures on their effi-
a ciencies, even though we don't agree that a private person 
9 economically could exist on some of the efficiencies that 
10 they use, 50 percent efficiency in some instances. We have 
11 gone ahead and used them, and, based in part on Mr. Bennett's 
12 testimony, 70 percent efficiency for most of the system and 
13 a 50 percent efficiency on portions of the tribal system, 
14 we come up within the acceptable range of available acre 
15 feet of water for the Tribes' needs and for the Waltons' 
16 needs, whether it is based on 36 inches of water or whether 
17 it is based on 42 inches of water. 
18 The graph we have set out here, we believe, is an 
19 accurate depiction of testimony that we believe was credible 
20 testimony, and the Court could rely upon it in reaching its 
21 decision on whether or not there was sufficient water 
22 available . 
23 Finally, in trying to tie up what Congress intended 
24 with the Dawes Act, we don't need to look just to the 
2$ authors of the bill, we can look to what actually happened, 




1 and in that regard, I think it is important that the deposi-
2 tion of Ire Parker -- we were fortunate to get that from him 
3 just prior to his death -- which takes me off track. 
4 Two of the surveyors died. The first one, I 
5 interviewed early on in the litigation, before I was able to 
6 get his deposition, passed away. He was the man who actually 
7 surveyed the original allotments for the Srnitakens, which 
8 are now the Walton properties . The second one died a short 
9 time after his deposition. 
10 If this Court adopts some rule that the successor 
11 or the Indian allottee acquires only that water which he was 
12 using when the land came out of trust status, this Court and 
13 every other court in the land is going to be faced with 
14 trying to preserve testimony that in another decade will no 
15 longer be available,and are we really to believe that people'E 
16 rights are going to depend on whether or not they can find 
17 an 85-, 95-y.ear- old individual that can go out and say, 
18 "Yes, I walked on the l and when I was 16 and they were 
19 irrigating umpteen acres." It just isn't going to happen 
20 anymore. I don't believe people's rights were intended to 
21 be relegated to whether or not they can find a witness from 
22 antiquity to state what water was being used. If we rely 
23 upon the practical, irrigable acres and the vested water 
24 right, we have solved the problem. 
25 In terms of what happened after Congress, we have 




1 surveyors out there at congressional direction, at the 
2 executive direction, the President's direction, surveying 
3 the land, individual Indians picking out tracts of land. 
4 What kind of land were they picking out? Dry land? No. 
5 They were picking out tracts of land with water on them, and, 
6 as Ire Parker pointed out, some of the allotments in the 
7 Nespelem area are very funny-shaped allotments, thin, thin 
a pieces of land , so that some allottee could get down to the 
9 river , get down to the creek . The Indian allottee thought 
10 he was getting water or he wouldn't have been concerned about 
11 the allotment being surveyed in that manner. 
12 Congress intended that if the individual allottee 
13 didn't want to use the land, farm it, be a farmer, he didn't 
14 have to be . He could use it as capital and go out and start 
15 some other free enterprise endeavor. On the Walton Allot-
16 rnent 525, we have Louie and Paul Srnitakens, sons of Alexander 
17 Srnitakens, asking the land be sold in fee, the allotment, so 
18 that they could have the money. The government, in asking 
19 for the application for the land to be sold, stated: 
20 "Heirs need proceeds to extend their business interests 
21 and provide themselves a horne." 
22 Louie and Paul, in signing their petition for the 
23 sale of inherited Indian lands, which were allotments~ 
24 
25 
"We wish to invest the money in business. We will sell 
on deferred payments or cash." 




1 They had a trucking business, in part, and they 
2 were going to take this money and use it. Why? Why would 
3 the government keep the water that made this land valuable 
4 if it really intended for these people to go out and sell 
5 the land and use the capital and invest it? Congress 
6 intended this to happen, and we have actual evidence in this 
7 case that it did happen. This supports the defendants' 
8 proposition that Congress intended water to go with the land. 
9 The allottees thought they were getting it when they selected 
10 the allotment. They sold the land at a price that reflected 
11 the price of water. They got the payments. It didn't go 
12 to the Tribe. The payments went to the individual Indians . 
13 To me, that is important. 
14 THE COURT: Counsel, it is 12:00 o'clock. I 
15 said I didn't want to cut you off, but 
16 MR. PRICE: I think you can at this point, 
17 Your Honor. I was just checking to see if I had tried to 
18 direct to some of the issues that you raised. 
19 THE COURT: Well, let's recess the case until 
20 2:30 and you can look your notes over and see if you want to 
21 continue. 
22 MR. PRICE: Thank you. 
23 THE BAILIFF: All rise. This court stands 
24 at recess until 2:30. 
25 (Luncheon recess is taken . ) 





2 THE BAILIFF: Court is reconvened following 
3 recess. Please be seated. 
4 MR. SWEENEY: Your Honor, one of these two 
5 cases that were mentioned on the July 3rd decision by the 
6 Supreme Court was United States v. New Mexico, and Mr. Veeder 
7 obtained a copy and our office made a copy and I was going 
8 to hand it up. 
9 THE COURT: I think someone furnished us a 
10 copy of that already during the noon hour. 
11 MR. VEEDER: I gave the bailiff one of those, 
12 Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Sweeney. 
14 Mr. Price, I guess we interrupted you for lunch. 
15 MR. PRICE: Thank you, Your Honor. I feel 
16 like I am taking a lot of time, but as I look back on the 
17 trial, every time I got up ·to introduce something, I reca l l 
18 the Court saying, "That can be in final argument," or, "That 
19 is more appropriate for argument, Counsel." I guess I am 
20 just trying to get my day in court here, one way or the 
21 other, and I will wind it up shortly. 
22 The reason I have laid so much emphasis on the 
23 General Allotment Act and the language of the authors or 
24 proponents of that specific legislation is that I think that 
25 is the controlling factor in this case. The Powers case, 




1 u.s. v. Powers, u.s. v. Alexander, the Montana case. I 
2 can't recall the name of it right now. All the cases that 
3 talk about or are presented with the question of whether or 
4 not there was a vesting of water rights with the allotment 
5 of the lands have answered that question in the affirmative. 
6 Whether or not it is dictum is for this Court to decide, but 
7 I am impressed with the fact that all the courts that have 
a had to face that issue directly or thought they had to face 
9 that issue have stated in one form or another that, yes, 
10 that water right did vest with the allotment. 
11 I think that carries some weight in terms of the 
12 rationale and persuasiveness of the General Al lotment Act, 
13 which has always been in issue in those cases, and those 
14 courts and those judges have been basically trying to 
15 interpret the General Allotment Act, and I think that is 
16 persuasive and should be persuasive to this Court. 
17 In the Kootenai Salish case, v. Polson, the 
18 District Court case in Montana, which I alluded to many 
19 times in my brief, I would like to quote, final ly , from the 
20 basic conclusion of that case because it so parallels the 
21 fact situation in this case. 
22 The court : 
23 "With respect to the final contention (that is the 
24 Tribe's) that because riparian rights were not 
2$ expressly granted by Congress, they cannot be 




1 implied . Plaintiff raised two fundamental principles 
2 of Indian law, one , only Congress has the power to 
3 abrogate Indian property rights." 
4 I have already directed myself to that. I think they have, 
s through the General Allotment Act, not abrogated them, but 
6 transmitted them. 
7 "Two, statutes in derogation of Indian property rights 
8 must be narrowly construed." 
9 Again , I am maintaining to the Court that we are not here 
10 in derogation of Indian property rights, but we are trying 
11 to uphold individual Indian property rights. 
12 "The Court, of course, recognizes these standards . 
13 There can be no question, however, that by means of 
14 the General Allotment Act and the amendments thereto, 
15 Congress expressed an intent to exercise its dominant 
16 power over Indian land by dividing and conveying those 








fee to Indians and non-Indians . In all other situa-
tions in which the federal government holds title to 
the beds and banks of navigable waters, a fee patent 
issued by the United States to riparian lands would 
include the rights of access and wharfage without an 
express provision in the patent . This is established 
as early as 1861." 
I am contending in this case that the United 




1 States Government knew how to reserve property rights. It 
1 knew how to reserve mineral rights, which it did in 
3 connection with conveyance of Indian allotments. It knew 
4 how to reserve water rights, which we cited extensively in 
5 our brief on the various instances and cases where the 
6 government has specifically reserved the water rights in 
7 opening up certain portions of the Indian reservation lands 
8 for entry under the mineral laws and other such laws. 
9 In this case, the exhibits presented to this 
10 Court show conclusively that the United States Government 
11 did not reserve any property rights. It conveyed the land 
12 to the allottee in fee patent and to non-Indians totally, 
13 without reservation, with all appurtenances. The wording is 
14 quite clear. There is nothing that the Tribe has presented 
15 that says that Congress or the courts of this land interpret 
16 a fee patent differently because it happens to have ori-
17 ginally been in the Indian reservation land. I know of no 
18 such document. When the United States conveyed those lands , 
19 they knew what they were about. It knew how to reserve 
20 those property rights it did not want to convey, but chose 
11 to convey all of the appurtenances that went with the land. 
11 The property rights include as an appurtenance, water. 
13 I am again quoting: 
14 "Where the United States holds title in trust for Indian 
15 tribes, federal common law is applicable to a 

















determination of the extent of a federal grant, despite 
the lack of any express congressional language to that 
effect. Given these principles, ·this Court cannot 
escape the conclusion that Congress must have intended 
that the fee patent issued would include the customary 
riparian rights of access and wharfage. The fact that 
Congress did not expressly delineate these rights does 
not negate their existence. It was not necessary for 
Congress to specify every incident of ownership which 
accompanies a patent to lands on an Indian reservation. 
"This conclusion is confirmed by the Senate Report 
on the Villa Sites Act in 1910 and the circular issued 
by the Department of the Interior. Certainly without 
14 the rights of access and wharfage, lands riparian to 
15 the south half of Flathead Lake would not have been 
16 considered as valuable as suggested in the report and 
17 circular. " 
11 I am contending that the exhibits that we have 
19 introduced with respect to the posting and appraisal of this 
20 land confirms the fact that the United States Government 
21 intended it to reflect water value, and, in fact, sold it 
n as such. 
23 The one exhibit that I have not called Your 
24 Honor's specific attention to is a letter with respect to 
2$ appraising one of the Waltons' allotments prior to its being 
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1 sold in fee. That letter is from the Superintendent of 
2 the Col ville Reservation to the Indian farmer who was making 
3 the appraisals, specifically rejecting his petition for one 
4 of the sales of the land until he went out and appraised the 
5 land again, calling to the Indian farmer's attention the 
6 fact that there was being development of irrigation on 
7 certain of the lands, and this would make the land more 
8 valuable, and that it should be appraised to reflect that 
9 increased value. In other words, the governmen·t intended 
10 the Indian allottee to get full price and full value for 
11 that land. What more could emphasize the fact that the 
12 Uni ted States Government thought it was sell ing the water 
13 with the land? 
14 The judge continues: 
15 "It is significant also that for more than half a 
16 century, the defendants and other riparian owners, 
17 with the full knowledge of the Federal Government 
18 and the Tribes, and without objection from either, 
19 expended large sums of money for docks and wharves 






Lake. Many persons built and maintain homes and 
business enterprises 
"Now, after more than 50 years of such activity 
on the Lake, plaintiffs claim that the riparian owners 
who have constructed piers and wharves beyond the high 




1 water mark are trespassers, should be enjoined from 
2 further trespass, and be requested to move immediately 
3 all buildings and structures beyond the high water 
4 mark. To grant this relief in light of the factual 
5 and legal considerations set forth above, would be a 
6 grievous injustice to the defendants and others in a 
7 similar position ." 
8 The court in that case relied heavily on the 
9 government 1 s advertising of the property as being valuable 
10 and actually referring in these circulars to the fqct that 
11 the wharves and piers could be built and would add to the 
12 value of the property. I think we had the same factual 
13 situation in this case. 
14 Finally, in summation, Your Honor, if I might 
15 approach the drawing board, I would just like to, if I can, 
16 pictorially, try and talk about the vesting of this water 
17 right in terms of what the Waltons succeeded to, if anything. 
18 In the black square, I am indicating we have a 
19 tract of land, and we will call it the Colville Indian 
20 Reservation. Within the confines of that Indian ~eservation, 
21 there is a certain amount of water that is not going to 
22 change, basically. That water can only go so far. The 
23 individual -- the Tribe communally owned that water at one 
24 time. Then, through the General Allotment Act, Congress 
2$ came along and said, we are going to take chunks out of 




1 there. We are going to allow the individual Indian to own 
2 that, farm it, and if he wants to, sell it. To sell it, it 
3 had to have water. 
4 The Indian allottee invested that portion of the 
5 water vested in that allottee at the time he acquired title 
6 to it, and his successors acquired that same title. By 
7 claiming that the successor to the Indian allottee gets 
a that water right, we have neither lessened nor made more 
9 the water available to the remaining members of the Indian 
10 Tribe. It's still the same amount of water. Congress 
11 dictated how it was going to be transmitted to individual 
1Z ownership . The fact that the Indian decides to sell it to 
13 a non-Indian does not lessen, in any manner, the remaining 
14 water the Tribe had, because they had what water was there, 
15 less the little chunks that had been granted by Congress. 
16 So, in denying the Tribe 1 s requested relief for 
17 injunction, we are not taking anything away that the Tribe 
18 had to begin with. We are merely recognizing what Congress 
19 did, that the individual Indian was to have this land, a 
20 portion of it, anyway, and the water that went with it, to 
21 use it for his own benefit. 
22 And with respect to the quantification of that 
23 water right, we believe the water duty which we have 
24 presented to Your Honor in the form of the chart and the 
2$ amount of water that is available there, we have presented 
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to you on the chart, and we would ask that Your Honor 
consider that as the appropriate finding of fact from which 
to base your conclusion of law. 
The only other comment I have at this time is that 
Mr. Veeder, I think probably by mistake, indicated that the 
6 Waltons didn't acquire from an Indian. I think that is just 
7 an oversight. Mr. Moomaw was an Indian, and to the best of 
8 my knowledge, he was a Colville Indian. 
9 Again, in closing, the only thing I can say is 
10 that I think we are arguing an allottee's interest and 
11 right that Congress intended him to have, and, as such, the 
12 Waltons succeed to that right . 
13 Mr. Driscoll spoke to new citizens' being 
14 administered the oath this afternoon, and he said -- he 
15 pointed up to a lot of problems in this country, but he said 
16 what makes this country different is that we are able to 
17 manage our problems. We are able to work with them. He 
18 said, to quote him as best I can, ''We are able to balance 
19 our conflicts;' and he referred to the Bakke case, ''And it is 
20 obvious the Supreme Court was attempting to balance, the 
21 best it could, competing interests." I agree with Mr. 
22 Driscoll, that is what sets this country apart, and we are 
23 asking this Court to balance these competing interests, and 
24 we think the legislative history supports the balance that 
25 we are asking for and that, in law, the injunction should 




1 be denied. 
2 We also ask that this Court consider in the 
3 interim as part of its order that to the extent there is any 
4 shortage of water, should it occur, that the water be pro-
5 rated on the basis of the practical, irrigable acres between 
6 the parties. 
7 I thank you very much, Your Honor . 
8 MR. VEEDER: Before counsel sits down, I 
9 realize this is entirely out of order, for me to interpose 
10 an objection. Are you speaking of this chart that was 
11 handed to the Court during your argument? 
12 MR. PRICE: We are just using that as a 
13 display. 
14 MR. VEEDER: Are you offering this in 
15 evidence, Mr. Price? 
HS MR . PRICE: No. 
17 MR. VEEDER: It was handed to the Court for 
18 his use? 
19 I object to it, Your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Well, I am treating it the same 
21 as an illustration given during summation. 
22 MR. VEEDER: I just want the record to show 
23 that I am making a serious objection to this course of 
24 conduct of counsel. 
2$ 
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1 MR. PRICE: I would be happy to write it up 
2 on the board as an illustration. I thought I would save the 
3 Court some time. 




MR . PRICE : Thank you, Your Honor. 
7 MR. ROE: May it please the Court, if it is 
8 satisfactory to the Court, the Sta~has divided up its 
9 argument. I will deal generally with the primary issue that 
10 the State is concerned with in this case, and that is the 
11 authority of the State to issue water rights such as the one 
11 issued to Mr. Walton, and deal briefly with the issue which 
13 we have referred to in the past as moccasin rights, the 
14 rights of a successor to an Indian allottee. 
15 Mr. Mack will deal basically with the facts along 
16 the lines of your introductory remarks this morning, dealing 
17 with the quantity of water available and the scope of the 
18 reserved right. 
19 Before I move into the basic argument, I want to 
20 mention something about the two cases that have been 
21 referred to continually this morning. I have had no con-
2l tacts with the Supreme Court of the United States except to 
13 discuss with the Deputy Clerk on Monday of this week what 
24 those cases seem to hold, and he read to me portions of 
15 those cases, and since that time, of course, Mr. Sweeney, 




1 through Mr. Veeder, has provided us a copy of one of them. 
2 I had hoped that I would be able to have both copies here 
3 and be able to be better prepared to discuss in detail some 
4 of the teachings of those cases, because I think, in terms 
5 of mining law, I guess there is a lot more gold in those 
6 cases for the State of Washington than there are for some of 
7 the other parties in this suit. 
a First of all, I think, just to bring to your 
9 attention, at a minimum, I think there are some basic 
10 teachings in those cases which are relevant here, even 
11 though, as I say, I haven't read one of them, and I only 
11 read the other one between 1:30 and 2:30. 
13 First of all, the Supreme Court has ruled rather 
14 conclusively that it is the United States, not the Tribe, 
15 that has reserved these rights that we are talking about in 
16 this case. In other words, they have confirmed what I think 
17 was the fair analysis of the conclusions in the cappaert 
11 case, which the Court is familiar with, which was decided 
19 in 1976, dealing with pup fish. 
20 The second issue that I think that the Court shoul 
21 be aware of is that the Supreme Court earlier this week has 
l2 discussed formulas for measuring the scope of federally-
23 reserved rights and the amounts of water within those scopes 
24 and they have cast those formulas in terms of limitations 
25 in minimums. 




1 Thirdly, the Court has discussed the issue that 
1 is troublesome to the State, and that is the issue of the 
3 wall around the reservation which latter-day revelation has 
4 given to the United States and the Indian Tribe the conclu-
5 sion that the state laws can•t permeate the boundaries of 
6 the reservation. I think that, surprisingly, both cases 
7 deal with that issue, even though I don't have, and I cannot 
8 tell you that I have read all of the California v. United 
9 States case, but I would refer to Your Honor, when he 
10 initially looks at them, on the issue of who reserves, the 
11 United States or the Indians, look at page 4, at pages 2 and 
11 4, I think, It would be decisive on that, on the limited 
13 amount issued that I mentioned. That would be pages 4 and 
14 5, especially in the footnote on page 5, and further, there 
15 are numerous teachings about the dominancy of which we talked 
16 in this Court in this case and a number of other cases about 
17 dominancy of federal water law, and , more importantly, I 
11 think there are some road signs, as I call them, clearly 
19 pointing that the United States Supreme Court is on the 
10 verge of announcing what we have been contending the law has 
11 been for a long time, that state water laws can be, as they 
11 have in the past , applied lawfully within the boundaries of 
13 an Indian reservation . Specifically in the kind of wind-
14 shield survey on my part, I would refer you to page 21 of 
15 the opinion . Also, as I understand it, Footnote 9 on page 




1 24 of the California opinion deals specifica lly with that 
2 subject . 
3 I would request a t this time, Your Honor, permis-
4 sion on behalf of the State, because these opinions, I think, 
5 are real significant, the opportunity to file a supplemental 
6 brief dealing directly with the issues I have just mentioned. 
7 Of course, I wouldn't have any objection to anybody else 
8 presenting their views, but they are of special importance, 
9 I think, to us . 
10 Now, then, I want to dwell, basically, only on one 
11 issue, and that is the issue of the State ' s juri sdiction. 
12 I s there a wall around the reservation? In more precise 
13 t erms, the question to be answered i nvolves the validity of 
14 the State ' s action granting a permit to the Waltons i n 1949. 
15 The United States and the Tribe., inconsistent 
16 with long-understood federal- reservation and state- reserva-
17 tion relationships, now contends that there is that wall 
18 that I mention around the reservation, lying on its 
19 boundaries, which state law cannot permeate or pierce. 
20 It seems to me that the starting point in the 
21 ana lysis of cases like this is to set forth the basic 
22 proposition and that is that state water law applies to all 
23 the waters on non-I ndian lands at all locations within a 
24 state, including federally-established Indian reservations, 
2$ unless one of two things takes plac e . Stated in question 




1 form, the first question to be asked is, has the state water 
2 law been removed or preempted from these waters on non-Indian 
3 lands either by a federal statute or a federal treaty, and 
4 the second basic inquiry, the first being preemption, is 
5 whether state water right laws have been ousted from these 
6 non-Indian lands because they interfere with the tribe 1 s 
7 limited powers of self-:government. By "limited", I mean the 
a powers to govern its members and its property interests. 
9 So, turning to the second inquiry first, can the 
10 State of Washington's action in this case involving excess 
11 waters interfere in any way with the Colville's tribal 
11 powers? Emphasized in earlier cases, the State's claims 
13 in this case do not deal with an assertion of power over 
14 the Colville Tribe or its members, and, likewise, we do not 
15 deal with any assertion of power over any reserved rights 
16 established by the United States for the Colville's benefit. 
17 The first point that I want to emphasize is that 
18 the State does recognize the Winters doctrine. It has 
19 ever since I have been at the Attorney General's office and 
20 before, and that is approximately two decades. 
21 We recognize that the United States does establish 
22 from time to time reserved rights to waters of creeks located 
23 in federal Indian reserves, and we recognize that they do, in 
24 this case, with regard to No Name Creek. 
25 It is a critically important ancillary concept 




1 which must be remembered, however, to properly fashion the 
2 outcome of this case, and that is that Winters does not 
3 stand for a proposition that all waters within a federal 
4 reserve are, as a matter of law, reserved to the benefit of 
5 the Indians. 
6 In 1976, as I mentioned earlier, the United States 
7 Supreme Court, in the Cappaert case, announced that the 
8 reserved rights were those limited amounts necessary to carr 
9 out the purposes for which a reservation was created, and 
10 that includes an Indian reservation, but that amount is no 
11 more than is necessary, and I would say, after reading the 
12 Mimbres Valley case, that that includes another limitation 
13 that it will be at a minimal amount. The point is that 
14 there can be, and oftentimes are, excess or surplus waters 
15 within the streams of the reservation. Let me just say 
16 that there is a perfect example that the Court can take 
17 judicial notice in the Colvill e Reservation situation, tak-
18 ing into account the Columbia River. There are, without 
19 question, surplus waters in almost all circumstances year 
20 round in that stream as it flaws through the Colville 
21 Reservation. I might say on that point that the State has 
22 been issuing water rights as late as earlier this year to 
23 non-Indian landowners within the Colville Indian Reservation 
24 and another reservation bordering the Columbia River. So 
25 far as I know, neither the United States nor any of the 




1 tribes involved have chosen to challenge the validity of 
2 those state permits in any judicial or quasi-judicial form . 
3 I must repeat that the state law only appl ies to 
4 excess or surplus waters on non-Indian, non-federal lands . 
5 Now, turning to how the State Water Code is 
6 administered, it is our view that the state Water Code has 
1 been implemented so that, as a matter of law, permits entered 
a issued under the Code, cannot , in any way, impair any 
9 federally-reserved Indian rights . 
10 First of all, just a matter of wording in every 
11 permit, these permits are issued as "subject to existing 
12 rights," and that would include any existing rights of the 
13 Indians. In the context of the Colvill e Reservation , all 
14 the federally-reserved rights of that reservation, which 
15 would be in the year 1872, would take precedent in the con-
16 text of a water shortage , over any state water rights, based 
17 on a permit, because a permit couldn't be issued until the 
18 1917 Water Code was enacted . 
19 So, it is our view that state law based permits 
20 issue d under the 1917 Code i n 1949 and 1950, in the case of 
21 the Waltons, does not, indeed it cannot, authorize any 
22 interference whatsoever with the exercise of prior rights of 
23 the Indians. Thus , in a year when there is not enough water 
24 to satisfy the exercise of the reserved right, then the 
2$ state's right is unexercisable for the period of that 




1 shortage . The state right, the Walton permit in this case, 
2 is only what they say in Western water law "paper right" 
3 under such a factual pattern. I should hasten to add that 
4 there are all kinds of paper rights in that sense. It is 
5 a common occurrence in Western water law. It is only when 
6 the excess waters or the surplus waters return to the stream 
7 that the state water right permit may be reactivated, come 
8 out of its dormant status. 
9 Thus, it seems to us that there can be no valid 
10 contention that the State authori zed interference with prior 
11 rights of the United States and the State did not authorize 
12 such a happening . It's even expressly precluded in the 
13 permit issued to the Waltons. Of course, the real problem 
14 in this whole case is that we are dealing with an unadjudi-
15 cated stream. No one really knows who is entitled to what, 
16 either whether they are basing their claim on the federally-
17 reserved rights held by the United States or those who have 
18 been transferred, such as Waltons' moccasin rights, successol 
19 to an Indian, until such time as they are quantified by a 
20 court . Under such circumstances, there can be no way, as 
21 a matter of law, that water rights can interfere with the 
22 powers , the water rights administration program of the 
23 State of Washington, can interfere with the self- government 
24 powers, if any there may be, of the Tribe over rights 
2$ reserved for them by the United States . 




1 Now, I want to turn briefly to the critical issue 
2 of state jurisdiction as it revolves around the question of, 
3 have state water right laws been preempted from application 
4 within the original boundaries of the Colville Reservation 
5 on non- Indian lands by operation of the supremacy clause? 
6 In other words, has the state water law been pushed out of 
7 the Colville Reservation, either by statute or treaty of 
8 the federal government? In as rapid-fire order as I can, 
9 the answer is, I think clearly, no, to all contentions by 
10 the United States and the Tribe, that federal statutes or 
11 the Washington State Constitutional provisions have erected 
12 a wall on the reservation through which the state's water 
13 rights l aws cannot pierce. 
14 First of all, Mr. Sweeney, and his predecessor, 
15 Mr. Sweeney, and his predecessor, and Mr. Burchette, have 
16 continually suggested to the Court that the federal Enabling 
17 Act that allowed Washington to enter the union contained 
18 some provision along the lines of preemption . It certainly, 
19 in our view, clearly does not. Note carefully what the 
20 federal disclaimer says. It provides, in pertinent part, 
21 that the people inhabiting said proposed state, which 
22 includes the State of Washington, do agree and declare that 
23 they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappro-
24 priated public lands lying with the boundaries of those 
25 states and said, " and to all lands lying within said limits 




1 owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes," and then it 
2 says, "and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute 
3 jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United 
4 States." 
5 The application of the State ' s Water Code in this 
6 case are to non-federal lands. Thus, we do not violate the 
7 mandate of that Enabling Act provision in any respect. The 
8 State does not assert, by word or deed or power, through its 
9 Water Code in this case, any claim of power over either 
10 Colville tribal members or their interests. Its application 
11 is only to the excess waters and to non-Indians and involv-
12 ing non-Indian lands . 
13 Further, just briefly to mention that absolute 
14 jurisdiction and control language that is set forth in the 
15 Enabling Act, first of all, the United States Supreme Court 
16 has held in the Organized Village of Kake case, which is 
17 cited to you, that that language of "absolute" is not the 
18 equivalent of exclusive. And, secondly, and more important-
19 ly for the purpose of this case, it is only talking about 
20 Indian lands, not non-Indian lands within the reservation. 
21 It is for the precise, same reasons that I just stated, 
22 Your Honor, that similar language in the Washington 
23 Constitution does not preempt the state law . 
24 Now, the next federal law or statute that the 
2$ United States suggests to Your Honor precludes the 




1 applicability of state law is Public Law 83-280. They cite 
that portion that says, "Nothing in this section shall 2 
authorize the alien nation, encumbrance or taxation of any 3 
4 water rights belonging to any Indian tribe that is held in 
5 trust by the United States." Well, the important point 
6 here, of course, is that that only applies to Indian inter-
7 ests, and the State of Washington, as I am becoming 
8 repetitive, isn't interested in those Indian interests. 
9 They are talking about the excess waters, and we are,on the 
10 non-Indian lands. 
11 Now, the United States also says that the State ' s 
12 counterpart of the statute, Public Law 83-280, which is 
13 RCW 37.12.050, contains the same bar, and, again, the 
14 barring language relates only to Indian interests. It is 
15 not a reservation-wide geographic bar. 
16 Further, the executive order of the present grant 
17 and the background relating thereto shows no intention to 
18 preclude the applicabi lity of state law and on this point 
19 I will defer to my partner, Mr. Mack, to discuss that in 
20 more detail. 
21 Now, 25 u.s.c. 381, part of the Dawes Act, has 
22 been discussed at length this morning. I can only say that 
23 for once I may agree with Mr. Veeder, in part, because it 
24 only deals with the power of the Secretary to allocate among 
2$ Indians in an equitable fashion for something that hasn't 
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1 been mentioned here, and that says, for agricultural pur-
2 poses. So, it is not even a statute that allows for 
3 allocation among other types of uses. 
4 In a nutshell, then, Your Honor, there is no clear 
5 intent derived from any federal statute or any federal ac-
6 tion which supports a conclusion that state water rights 
7 laws have been removed under all circumstances from non-
8 Indian lands in excess water on the Colville Reservation. 
9 Now, I want to shift gears very dramatically for 
10 a moment. Even assuming that our analysis, our basic 
11 analysis is incorrect, that is,that the state is there 
12 unless it is pushed out either by federal statutes, treaties 
13 or interference with the powers of the Tribe to govern 
14 themselves and their interests, the federal government seems 
15 to take the position that, if our state laws are to apply, 
16 we must find some federal statute that grants that power, 
17 and I ask the Court to examine three statutes. They are in 
18 our briefs and I won't repeat them more to say than that 
19 Public Law 83-280 invited the states to apply their laws 
20 within a reservation and by Chapter 37.12, RCW, at least 
21 since 1963, in the Colville Reservation, if not before, 
Washington State civil laws, including its water laws, have 
23 been applicable to non-Indian fee lands within the Colville 
24 Indian Reservation. This is the clear, literal reading of 
25 the State's actions. 





1 Secondly, I would ask the Court to examine a 
1 portion of the General Allotment Act, six and seven, 25 
3 u.s.c. 349 , which states that, "Upon the completion of said 
4 allotments and the patenting of the lands to said allottees, 
5 each and every member of the respective bands or tribes of 
6 Indians to allotments have been made, shall have the benefit 
7 and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the 
a state and territory in which they reside." 
9 In other words, this section stated that when an 
10 allotment process was complete for a given Indian, he is 
11 subject to all of the laws of the state and territory in 
12 which he resides. Accordingly, when an Indian allottee 
13 conveys his allotment to a non-Indian, that non- Indian would 
14 be subject to the laws of the state, territory, so far as 
15 water laws are concerned. 
16 Finally, again, once in a while Mr. Veeder and I 
17 do agree on something, and apparently we do, at least in 
18 part. The Colville Tribe provides us assistance on the 
19 third federal statute we bring to your attention, the one 
20 that I think is , while not completely relevant here, one 
21 that should be taken seriously into account, and that deals 
22 with waters on non-Indian homesteaded lands within a 
23 reservation. 
24 Now, Mr. Veeder points out, and he ' mentioned today 
25 in oral argument, that the only way to establish water rights 




1 when those types of lands, wherever located in the federal 
2 domain, are transferred to non-federal status, that the 
3 Supreme Court of the United States has held that no water 
4 rights pass with that transfer. The Supreme Court also has 
5 told us, where do you look? You look to state water law. 


















are apparently no homesteaded lands in question here in the 
No Name Valley, cases like this have a broad application and 
sometimes are read to have application outside the boundaries 
of No Name Valley into areas where there are homesteaded 
lands on the reservation, and to that extent, I bring that 
statute to Your Honor's attention. 
Finally, the Supreme Court has decided a number of 
cases recently involving Indians or water rights which 
contain valuable road signs to assist in resolution of cases 
of this type. 
First, in the Oliphant case, decided on March 6 
of this year, as well as the Charleston Products case, 
decided March 31, 1978, among others, we note the increasing 
importance that the United States Supreme Court is giving to 
the history and long-held understandings, practices, actions, 
customs, of responsible governmental officials to determine 
jurisdictional relationships of government in Indian 
24 reservation and Western water right law situations. In 
25 this context, we note, again, the long-held understanding, 




1 not only of Washington State Water Code administrators, but 
2 lawyers of the Department of Interior and the Department of 
3 Justice, those views having been brought to the Court's 
4 attention earlier in our briefs, that state water laws 
5 apply to surplus waters on non-Indian lands within the 
6 reservation. The Washington State engineer who administers 
7 the Code, the Code now administered by the Honorable Wilbur 
8 Hallauer, has issued many permits on the Colville Reserva-
9 tion and other reservations throughout the State. Most, 
10 like the Wal·tons' permit, were not objected to, either by 
11 the Tribe or the United States at the time of the issuance 
12 by the State. The State of Washington's administrative 
13 practices are in accord with the West-wide practice of the 
14 sister-state water code administrators. 
15 The Court is aware of and may take judicial 
16 notice of the position of the United States Department of 
17 Justice taken on the surplus waters issue in the Bel Bay 
18 case, which is still pending before J udge Voorhees in the 
19 Western District. The United States• position taken at the 
20 beginning of that case, and the position of the Department 
21 of Justice was that state water laws could be validly 
22 applied to excess waters on non-Indian lands. Indeed, it 
23 was for that very reason that the Justice Department's 
24 position that the excess-water doctrine had validity, that 
2$ the Lummi Tribe intervened in the case, alleging the 




1 Department of Justice was not properly representing the 
2 Tribe. 
3 Further, the Court is aware of and can take notice 
4 of the Portland Solicitor's Office of the Department of 
5 Interior, supporting the state authority over surplus waters 
6 in the context of state power on the Tulalip Reservation . 
7 In this regard, I bring the Court's attention to the Tulalip 
8 Tribe v. Walker. There, Judge Charles Denny upheld the 
9 power of Washington State's Water Administrator, Mr. Walker, 
10 to issue permits relating to surplus waters on non-Indian 
11 lands within the original boundaries of the Tulalip 
12 Reservation near Everett. The exact issue faced by the 
13 court there is faced by the Court here. 
14 The Court could also take notice that at this 
15 very moment -- I sound like Mr. Veeder -- at this very 
16 moment, that at this very moment, the United states, in the 
17 Chamokane Creek case, asks this Court to confirm, in the 
18 United States, a water right with a 1952 priority date to 
19 withdraw and make use of waters located within the boundar-
20 ies of the Spokane Reservation, based on Washington State 
21 law. 
22 Finally, in this area, we note and commend to the 
23 Court's careful attention, that the Ninth Circuit, as early 
24 as 1908, if not before, has recognized the validity of 
25 water rights relating to surplus waters within an Indian 




1 reservation, based on state law, and I am referring to the 
2 case of Conrad Investment Company v . The United States, whic 
3 we have cited in our brief, which is 161 F.829. Indeed, 
4 the court held that the stream in that case , Birch Creek, 
5 should contain 1,666 miner's inches to satisfy federal 
6 reserve Indian rights, with the remainder of t he stream, 
7 which is within the reservation , available to satis fy the 
8 non-Indian right. The diversion in that case was a diver-
9 sion located within the original boundaries of the 
10 reservation . It was almost identical to the Ahtanum Creek 
11 litigation, where it was a boundary stream, and that there 
12 were water rights established with regard to waters flowing 
13 through that Birch Creek, as opposed to through the 
14 reservation. I want to note that the court, in that case 
15 -- it is the Court of Appeals -- granted, enjoined, - -
16 granted injunction against the investment company, Conrad 
17 Investment Company , so that 1,666 miner's inches would 
18 bypass by their diversion, its diversion works,to satisfy 
19 the reserve right, but the important point was, in that 
20 creek , that the facts of the case show that the minimum 
21 flow in that stream, historically, was 2500 miner's inches 
22 and the maximum was in the range of 150,000 miner' s inches, 
23 and I quote from that case , just briefly. This is on page 
24 834 of 161 Federal Reporter. 
2$ "This decree does not at any time reserve all waters 




1 of Birch Creek for the complainant , but leaves a 
2 considerable flow of water to be retained by defendant ' s 
3 dam and used in its system or irrigation . " 
4 And I want to add to this , Your Honor, that the right s, I 
5 think it was qui te c l ear, I did investigate thi s matter at 
6 the Federal Recor ds Center in San Bruno , Californi a, ear l i er , 
7 that it is quite c l ear that the rights that Conrad Inves t men 
8 Company were rel ying upon which had their base of dive rsion 
9 inside the reservation although their use was outside the 
10 reservation on non- Indian lands, was based on s t ate l aw, the 
11 law of the State of Montana . So , even the Ninth Circuit, 
12 as long ago as 1908, has recognized the validity of the 
13 state permits where there are excess waters invol ved . 
14 I do want to speak briefly as to the arguments 
15 made by Mr . Veeder and Mr. SWeeney . 
16 With regard to the state jurisdiction , I only 
17 want to say one point . Counsel for the Tribe says that there 
II is a long line of unbroken, "an unbroken series" , I think 
19 were the exact words, of cases which say that the State has 
20 no power inside t he r eservation . He cited United States v. 
21 Winters, and then he described what Winters said correctly, 
22 and that says that state rights can't interfere with prior 
23 federal- reserved rights. Two points. As I mentioned 
24 earlier, Winters doesn't say anything about precluding the 
25 state power. To the contrary , it seems to me that it 
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1 probably says there are some situations where state water 
2 rights law can apply. 
3 The second part is that Mr. Veeder onl y, in that 
4 long, unbroken series, didn't mention any other cases, and 
5 certainly there are no cases in the United States Supreme 
6 Court that hold that . 
7 Now, then, secondly, I didn't plan on talking 
8 about the whole i ssue of the allottee ' s rights , non-Indian 
9 allottee's rights as successor to an Indian. I just want --
10 I c all them moccasin rights for shorthand purposes, standing 
11 in the moccasins of the Indian . It seems to me that the 
12 analysis there is pretty easy, and with regard to the folks 
13 on this side of the table , on this side of the room , that 
14 would come off at somewhat at odds with them, especially 
15 the position taken by Mr . Veeder. 
16 First of all, we do recognize there are reserved 
17 rights . The non-Indian obtained whatever the Indian had. 
11 The Indian had a portion of the water right . When the 
19 transfer of that right took place, there is a compl ete 
20 severance of the federal trust. When that took place , then 
21 it was water owned by a non- Indian, and here is where we 
22 part, is that, at that point, when the non-Indian obtains 
23 the allotment, water rights, then they become subject to 
24 the regulatory powers, forfeiture laws , of the state law. 
2$ The issue of reasonable use has come up. I think 




1 what is going on there, and maybe someone else is a lot 
2 wiser , surely there are many that are, but I think what the 
3 Court did in that case was to mix up an allotment right , 
4 a portion of the reserved right, and the water l aw that 
5 attaches to that with Western water law, dealing entirely 
6 with appropriati on . If you don't put water to a beneficial 
7 use within a reasonable time after you have s hown an i nten-
8 tion to do so, why, you don't get the benefit of t he 
9 relation-back theory. Now , I think that, without going into 
10 detail there, that the District Court in Idaho in the 1920's 
11 engrafted a piece of state law that wasn't reall y applicable 
12 to the situation involved. The way I look at it, there is 
13 no freezing of the right at the time of the transfer from 
14 federal to non- federal . There is no freezing of that r i ght . 
15 Whatever the Indian had when I acquired it, if I acquired 
16 one, I can conti n ue to exercise that right . The onl y 
17 difference now is that after its determination of s everance 
18 from the federa l trust, then this whole gamut of Washi ngton 
19 water law falls upon it. Whether I can continue to exercise 
20 it in that situation depends on whether I am not somehow 
21 limited by Washington state laws. 
22 The gist of the argument by counsel for the 
23 Colville Tribe is, in effect, to do in, I think, some of 
24 the valuable rights they have . I think the Court ha s asked 
2$ a number of questions along this line. Stated in i ts 
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1 simplest form , i f you don ' t have water rights to sell, your 
2 land hasn ' t value. As a practical matter, you are frozen 
3 with keeping your lands . I don ' t think that is what Congress 
4 intended by the Al lotment Act . I t hink there was an inten-
5 tion that individual Indians be given a piece of property 
6 and if they wanted to sell that property to someone e lse , 
7 they could do so, and most importantly , at fair market 
8 value , and that can only take place in most of the arid West 
9 where Indian rese rvations are located, if water rights 
10 attach, and that is the sickness I see with the position 
11 it is almost a policy position as well as a legal position 
12 of the position contended for by Mr. Veeder . 
13 There is only one comment I want to make about Mr . 
14 Sweeney•s argument , and that is that, at the very last of 
15 his statements, he said, suggested that somehow we have to 
16 have one entit y, manager of water resources . That i s an 
17 ideal, and Judge Voorhees suggested that in the Bel B ay case. 
18 As I tried to poi nt out in some detail when I went over, 
19 pa ragraph by paragraph, where I thought Judge Voorhees had 
20 gone wrong, that just isn ' t the situation. It is not the 
21 situation. Congress didn't -- Congress has never suggested 
22 t hat there should be -- there is one water allocation 
23 system, and to the extent , I think , Your Honor , that there 
24 is a congressional intent to have one water manager for all 
2$ waters within that watershed with an estate, every road 




1 sign that I see, from the McCarran Amendment in the early 
2 '50s until the opinion that was entered on Monday by Justice 
3 Rehnquist, if there is going to be one, that is certainly 
4 pointing towards the state. In other words, the policy 
5 should not be to oust the state, but to bring the state into 
6 position where it c an take care of these water- re l a t ed 
7 decisions in a rati onal manner . 
8 So, I ask the Court, in conclusion, to approach 
9 very cautiously the revolutionary, revisional law contended 
10 for by the United States and the Colville Tribe in this 
11 case . It has the seeds for causing a great disarray, which 
12 Justice Marshall described in the Charleston case, in the 
13 administration of the water rights law throughout t he 
14 Western United States. 
15 Thank you, Your Honor. 
16 THE COURT : Mr . Roe, as I get your statement, 
17 it is the position of the State that you claim t he r i ght to 
11 allocate or give water permits under state law 
19 MR. ROE: That's right . 
20 THE COURT: - - to the extent that there is 
21 excess waters on non- Indian lands within a reservation . 
22 That's shorthand , but is this what you are saying? 
23 MR. ROE: That is right . 
24 THE COURT: That raises a question . The 
2$ availability of so- called excess waters is not a static 





2 MR . ROE: Exactly. 
3 THE COURT: So, if your position is correct, 
4 at wha·t point do we know there is excess waters? I can make 
5 a ruling on the evidence in this case as to the existing 
6 situation right now, but that may not hold for next year. 
7 MR. ROE: That is true in every situation. 
8 THE COURT: So, as a practical matter, how 
9 do you handle it? 
10 MR. ROE: Well, the practicalities of it is 
11 that that is Western water law, and that is Western water. 
12 Because of drought and the demands placed by human beings, 
13 some days they want to take vacation, they don't want to 
14 plant this, they don't take as much water, all of these 
15 things. Some people are not going to get the rights, and 
16 sometimes -- • 
17 THE COURT: Well, I understand that we are 
18 not dealing with this reserved right, but by the very 
19 definition of the State's position, you are limiting yourself 
20 to excess waters. 
21 MR. ROE: That is right. 
THE COURT : And it seems to me that this adds 
23 another dimension to the problem of the normal adjudication 
24 and allocation of waters within a watershed. 
25 
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1 point . We had the same problem, as you know, when you 
2 dealt with the In re Stranger Creek for the Washington State 
3 Supreme Court. We have the riparian rights doctrine in this 
4 state. You confirmed that. It is alive and well. In many, 
5 many respects, it is identical to reserved right. It sits 
6 there dormant for many years, but that doesn't stop the 
7 State of Washington from issuing all kinds of prior-appro-
8 priation doctrine permits, but if somebody wants to warm up 
9 one of those permits, riparian rights, exercise them, with 
10 an earlier date, I think it is almost an exact same situa-
11 tion. It is a very unsatisfactory situation. Water laws 
12 developed that way in the West, and in those cases where 
13 they had so-called California or dual-system doctrines 
14 developed, that we operate with a lot of unknowns, and the 
15 only way that we could answer it is through general adjudi-
16 cation whereby we can confirm claimed rights that have been 
17 established in the past so we know them precisely and then 
18 we can regulate them, and, I should add, by the way, Your 
19 Honor, that in the context of the McCarran Amendment, which 
20 consented that the United States, including the United 
21 States representing the Indian interests, to be joined and 
22 required to participate in general adjudications, including 
23 adjudication of state court, as you are well aware. That 
24 case that you were involved in in the Supreme Court was 
2S exactly that type of rights, readjudicated Indian rights. 




1 Until we have an ideal situation where we can 
2 adjudicate all of these rights, we just have all of these 
3 unknowns that we have to live with, but I don't spot that 
4 as anything but not a very well designed system, but I don • t 
5 think that is the type of, almost a policy conclusion, that 
6 should preclude the state from continuing what it has been, 
7 in a dominant role, in the entire water systems of our 
8 state, including those on the reservations. 
9 THE COURT: It isn't the first time that I 
10 find that what I wrote on the Supreme Court causes me 
11 difficulty when I get here. 
12 MR. ROE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Mack, do you have something 
14 further for the State? 
15 MR. MACK: Yes, Your Honor. 
16 Your Honor1 I would limit myself generally to three 
17 areas, seeing as how the State has already filed written 
11 argument and most of the matters dealing with the facts of 
19 this case have been dealt with in some detail. 
20 One of those is this notion of the figure which 
21 the Court, or the analysis which the Court must employ in 
22 deriving a figure for the water availability for this valley. 
23 The second is the history of use of the water in 
24 the valley, which, at least as far as the State is con-
2$ cerned, has relevance to Your Honor's decision. 




1 Third, is what the State sees as three elements 
2 of the physical situation in the valley which complicate the 
3 Court's ability to derive a figure for the Winters reserved 
4 rights in the valley, and so I would proceed along that line. 
5 First, this notion of how , what analysis the Court 
6 is to employ for deriving the water-availability f i gure, 
7 there has been s ome testimony, especially on the part of the 
a Tribes , as to,the term used by them was, "firm annual 
9 supply", and some suggestion, at least, that the Court 
10 should be looking at that figure, if, in fact, such a 
11 figure could be ascertained, and that that is a figure which 
12 then should be plugged into, if you will, a Winters reserved 
13 right equation, along with a figure for water duty, and for 
14 irrigable acres, and by simply doing that , then the Court 
15 would derive the answers to this case. 
16 For a variety of reasonsv the State thinks that is 
17 not only too s i mplistic an approach here, but it would be an 
18 erroneous approach . The reasons for that start wi th the 
19 fact that Western water law, in all of the states, including 
20 Washington, is based on the notion of use . Western water 
2 1 rights are generally, as the courts have used the term, 
22 usufructuary. They depend on use , and one year there may 
23 be a surplus of water and one year not, and so those who 
24 hold the rights may not be able to exercise them . 
25 The Tri be's firm annual supply figure is essen-
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1 tially, as has been pointed out in our written argument , 
2 based on sort of a dought-year analysis, and it ignores those 
3 years in which there may be more water than there would be in 
4 short years . 
5 Indeed, three other things need to be said here . 
6 One is that the Tribe itself, in designing its system and 
7 in putting water to use , does not at all rely on any firm 
8 annual supply figure, but rather looks to how much water 
9 is available in a particular year or particular month or 
10 particular week, as anyone would . 
11 Second, if the Tribe is correct that the Court mus 
12 look to a so-called firm annual supply, and that that is the 
13 extent of the water that the Court should consider of use 
14 in the valley , then the question immediately arises, the 
15 following question arises - - the following question arises, 
16 at least in my mind, did President Grant, then, intend i n 
17 reserving water for No Name Creek Valley to reserve simply 
18 that amount of water which now the Tribe has decided is 550 
19 acre feet, and that is the outside limit of t he Winters 
20 reserved rights, since that is the only firm a nnual supply 





think he did, and I think it points out t he erroneous 
reliance on that figure. 
Third, we have counsel for the Tribe's statement 
today that with regard to just and equal distribution of 




1 water, that that is a matter that varies from month to month, 
2 as counsel for the Tribes stated, and he even got down to 
3 the problems for each individual allotment in the valley on 
4 that . 
5 I might add that at page 44 of the Tribe 's argu-
6 rnent, written argument, the Tribe itself says that one has 
7 to look to Western water laws to determine what this water 
a available - - how one determines rights in this valley. 
9 The Court has a lot of figures in front of it. It 
10 has Dr . Maddox's figure of 1 200 to 1300 acre feet. It has 
11 Mr . Cline ' s figure of 1100 acre feet , assuming certain 
12 conditions, and somewhere under a thousand acre feet, assurn-
13 ing other conditions. It has Mr . Watson's various figures. 
14 It has Mr. Jones' figures; although Mr. Jones' figures 
15 changed occasionally, they always were safely between the 
16 estimates of the United States Geological Survey and those 
17 of the Tribe, and fell somewhere in the middle. 
18 The State would also point out that the United 
19 States' method for corning up with a water availability 
20 figure and a water duty figure is found on pages9 to 11 of 
21 the final argument , written argument, of the United States, 
22 is a strange system, according to, at least in our view, 
23 and should not be relied on by the Court. 
24 The United States has used an averaging method , 
2$ it seems, at least on pages 9 to 11. It takes the various 
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1 estimates of the experts and adds them up and divides by 
2 the number of experts and decides that that is a reasonable 
3 way to proceed . 
4 It seems to have two problems . One is that 
5 sometimes an expert's numbers are added in and s ometimes 
6 they are not, dependi ng, apparently, on what the r esult 
7 ought to be. Dr. Maddox's figure on water duty i s p lugged 
8 into the average for the water duty . His figures on water 
9 availability, apparently because they are high and would 
10 raise the average, are not plugged into the calcul ations 
11 for water availability, with no explanation for that , for 
12 the discrepancy. 
13 The second problem, really, is why this sort of 
14 thing should not be done . If Your Honor had a jury - - at 
15 least I learned this the first year of law school, disagreed 
16 with it , but I learned it otherwise had a jury t hat carne 
17 in with an average figure, on a damage, for example, on a 
11 liability claim, Mr. Sweeney, if he were involved i n the 
19 trial, the United States would be the first one to ask that 
20 that verdict be thrown out. It is simply not a proper way 
21 of corning up with the figure , and it is not a proper way to 
22 do it here . 
23 With regard to the water duty figures, Your Honor 
24 mentioned at the beginning of the day that he was concerned 
25 with that . That is a difficult matter on which there was an 




1 abundance of testimony. The State would simply say that the 
2 Court has before it the testimony of those people most 
3 experienced in this area of Washington State, primarily Mr. 
4 Bennett who came up with the reasonable figure, not based on 
5 any contrived anal ysis or, in fact, based on outdated 
6 publications, but on actual use in the area. It is a figure 
7 that is not low, but it is not high. There are parties to 
8 this litigation that would like the water duty figure and 
9 the irrigable acreage figure to be as high as possible, with 
10 the water availability as low as possible. That produces the 
11 best results, from their standpoint. But I think, fairly 
12 stated, the water duty figures that were put forward by 
13 various witnesses, including Mr. Bennett and Dr. Maddox, 
14 were far more reasonable than the figures put forth by the 
15 other people. 
16 Now, the second area I would like to get into is 
17 the historical use in the valley, Your Honor. 
18 There are two important points here . First, in 
19 some years, there has been, and in future years, there may 
20 be, excess waters in the No Name Creek Valley, and I use 
21 the term, 11 excess waters", in the way we have used them 
22 today. And, second -- and there has been no evidence 
23 presented at all during the trial contradicting this 
24 second, in the period of 1948 to 1950, which was the period 
2$ in which the State issued its surface water permit for the 





















right to divert surface water to Mr. Walton, there were 
excess waters, if one looks to the use of waters in that 
valley, and I ask Your Honor for a while to look at the 
actual use of waters at various periods, for irrigation 
primarily, in the No Name Creek Valley, which, by the way, 
according to the pretrial order, is the area we are con-
cerned with, and I speak not of some aquifer, not of some 
basin, not of someone's preconceived notion of what the 
valley ought to be, but the valley as it physically, 
geographically, exists today, and as it existed at the time 
the reservation was created. 
In 1950, when the certificate was issued by the 
State, the one under attack here, there is no question, 
according to the testimony Your Honor has heard, that, first 
of all, there was no objection from either the United States 
or the Tribe to the issuance of that permit, that certifi-
cate, and, second, there was no other use in the valley with 
18 which that water right could interfere. The State at that 
19 period looked not to the theoretical limit of the use of 
20 waters under all Winters rights in that valley, but to the 
21 actual use of water, and at that time, in the late 1940's 
22 and in 1950, there were excess waters. As Mr. Roe pointed 
23 out, the State permit and the certificate which is governed 
24 by the permit, in part, clearly stated that the right given 
25 to Mr. Walton was subject to all preexisting rights, and that 




1 includes Winters reserved rights, which, if they were to be 
2 exercised, may, in fact, provide in all years or some years 
3 that Mr. Walton may have little or no water under his State 
4 permit or certificate. Nevert heless, in 1 950 he did have the 
5 use of waters under that certificate, and for some years 
6 thereafter, because of the lack of use of other waters in 
7 the valley, and may, in fact, have use in future years. 
a We also ask Your Honor to look at the historical 
9 use of waters in this valley for allotments which are not 
10 Mr. Walton's, first, Allotments 901 and 903. The use of 
11 Winters reserved rights waters for those allotments derived 
12 their waters from No Name Creek, there is no question, in 
13 limited amounts. With regard to Allotments 892 and 526, the 
14 exercise of Winters reserved rights for those allotments 
15 derived their surface waters from Omak Creek and not from 
16 No Name Creek. Important here is, first of all, the fact 
17 that this was done, and, second, the fact that at the time 
18 of the creation of the reservation, it was certainly within 
19 the contemplation of the federal government that such 
20 waters would be the surface waters used for those upper 
21 parcels of property, and that cer·tainly was the contempla-
22 tion at the time the allotments were created. 
23 As the Waltons point out at page 5 of their 
24 supplemental memorandum, i n quoting from Felix Cohen's 
2$ handbook on federal Indian law with regard to the Powers 




I case, that it 11 Compells the view that the right to use 
2 water is a right aPpurtenant to the land within the reserva-
3 tion and that unless excluded, it passes to each grantee 
4 and subsequent conveyance of the allotted lands." 
5 The use of waters from Omak Creek, at least for 
6 the upper allotments in this valley, was the use of waters 
7 under the Winters reserved rights, which they became 
8 appurtenant to that allotment, and the Winters reserved 
9 right, to the extent it was exercised for surface waters in 
10 that upper a llotment, was certainly to use waters from Omak 
11 Creek and not from No Name Creek. There is substantial 
12 evidence from the more elderly people who testified who 
13 knew about the valley, about the historical use of irriga-
14 tion waters in this area, and that conforms with the State's 
15 view. 
16 We should also look , I believe, at the history of 
17 federal behavior with regard to this reservation, and I go 
18 into this not for any argument of estoppel against the 
19 federal government, but because the Supreme Court, in variou 
20 cases, including the Cappaert case, including Oliphant, and 
21 including the recent case of Andrews v. Charleston Products 
22 Company, has emphasized the importance in this area of look-
23 ing at federal administrative behavior and congressional 
24 actions, to see what the actual intention was in creating 
2$ the reservation, or in creating the federal right. We have 




1 fully briefed this and mentioned it in our written argument, 
2 but I would just like to say today that consistently, until 
3 the beginning of this litigation, the federal government, in 
4 various ways, recognized a state jurisdiction over the use 
5 of waters on the Colville Reservation, and recognized the 
6 applicability of state law, water l aw, on the reservation. 
7 We have cited some of those statements . They can be found 
a with regard to the Bureau of Indian Affairs agents on the 
9 reservation , both in the last century and in this century. 
10 They may be found at the highest level of the Executive 
11 Branch of the government. They may be found in various 
12 statements of congressional committees throughout the years 
13 and in statements by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs . 
14 The United States Government, with regard to this 
15 particular reservation, always spoke of the reservation made 
16 here in limited terms. There are congressional statements 
17 to that, and we call the Court's attention especially to 
18 the proposed legisla t ion in 1908 by the then-Secretary o f 
19 Interior Garfield for the additional reservation of water 
20 within the Colville Reservation for federal power purposes, 
21 which, to this date, at least, and we propound this, put 
22 it forward today , was an implied recognition by the Secretary 
23 that the federal government had not reserved all waters on 
24 the Colville Indian Reservation for federal purposes, and it 
2$ was an implied recognition that the recognition of waters on 




1 this reserv~tion was, in fact, a limited one. In this 
2 regard, the date at which President Grant sat down and 
3 signed his executive order is important, 1872, because of 
4 the various policies then in effect in the Department of 
5 Interior and the Executive Branch and the Congress, in 
6 regard to various Indians' rights and with regard to the 
7 nature of rights created by treaty by reservation. Indeed , 
8 it is because of the importance of the 1870's that this 
9 reservation was not created by treaty. It was at this 
10 period tha·t the Congress and the Executive Branch both 
11 decided that the signing of treaties with Indian tribes 
12 was wrong, in that it seriously misled people as to the 
13 nature of the rights Indian tribes have, and the nature 
14 of the reservations made by the federal government. 
15 There is also the constant history of no objection 
16 by the Tribes or the federal government to State action. 
17 Now, finally, Your Honor, there are three matters 
18 which I think of, in physical terms, with regard to this 
19 reservation or this valley , which I think complicates your 
20 duties. 
21 Before I get to those, though, I would like to 
22 treat the one thing that continues to swim around here, 
23 and that is the Lahontan cutthroat trout. The State has 
24 fi led a supplemental memorandum on the recent TVA caseo 
2S I would only add three things . One, that there is a major 




1 distinction in that the snail darter was, of course, native 
2 to the waters in the TVA area, whereas this fish is not 
3 native to these waters. 
4 I guess I have only two things on this, and, 
5 second, the result of the Tribes' argument, apparently, 
6 would be that, if, for example, it could not get all of the 
1 water in this valley by importing Lahontan cutthroat trout, 
8 that, if it could even import snail darters, that it could 
9 ask for more water, or that, the people who opposed the dam, 
10 the Tellico Dam, if they could not have found a native fish, 
11 they would have imported an endangered fish and dumped it 
12 in the river and then claimed that the dam should be stopped. 
13 The important distinction here is that the Lahontan cut-
14 throat trout is not native to this area . The State does 
15 not object to tribal efforts to raise a Lahontan cutthroat 
16 fishery, but it does object to the ballooning effect that 
17 that has, apparently in the Tribes' view it is Winters 
18 reserved rights. Almost an unlimited claim for reserved 
19 rights could be made under such a view. 
20 Now, the three final things I would like to go 
21 into concern, number one, the surface waters here, and 
22 number two, the groundwaters, and number three, the allot-
23 ments. 
24 There has been much talk during this trial, and 
25 Your Honor had a great deal of trouble because of counsels' 





1 arguments over which surface waters ought to be considered 
1 in this trial, and the State heard, as everyone else did, 
3 from the Tribes and the United States that Omak Creek wasn't 
4 involved in this case . Indeed, the State is somewhat sur-
5 prised that in all of the exhibits the United States and 
6 the Tribe put in , that Omak Creek appears and was not blacke 
7 out. Indeed, if the exhibits on which Omak Creek appears 
8 put in by the Tribe and the U.S . were to be removed, it 
9 would have no case. The reason is that Omak Creek is an 
10 integral part of the No Name Creek Valley . It always has 
11 been and it probably always will be, md it is not because 
11 the State has put it there. The pretrial order did not 
13 limit this Court to simply look at the surface waters of No 
14 Name Creek. 
15 Omak Creek is important for two reasons. One is 
16 that there would be a much diminished groundwater supply ti 
17 it were not for that creek. On that, everyone agrees . But, 
18 second, and most important to the State, Omak Creek has been 
19 the historical source of water for irrigation purposes for 
10 much of the land in the No Name Creek Valley, and there are 
21 no blinders which can hide that fact, and the State believes 
11 that that is relevant in a determination of which all otments, 
23 for all of the allotments that exercise Winters reserve 
24 rights, which ones exercise Winters reserve rights, to what 
2$ limit, and from what source . 




1 The second complicating factua~ matter, at least 
1 as far as the United States and the Tribes are concerned, is 
3 the groundwater here . The Tribes would have the Court 
4 believe that there are, indeed, two different aquifers, one 
5 conveniently above Mr. Walton's property and one below it, 
6 and that they are separated by this so-called aquiclude. 
7 If that is the case, it is possibl e that the Court should 
8 apply, by the Tribes• arguments, two different analyses in 
9 determining, coming up with -- in other words, two different 
10 water availability figures for the aquifers and the lands 
11 that overlie them. 
11 The third problem, and I submit that this is the 
13 most important factual problem in determining water avail-
14 ability, is the allotment problem, and I explain that in 
15 this way: If the lands in this valley had not been allotted, 
16 the arguments, of the Tribes at least, would make much more 
17 sense because the Tribes ask Your Honor to look at the 
18 Tribes as the one holder of all Winters reserve rights in 
19 this valley, and if Your Honor does that and Your Honor can 
10 find water availability figure, water duty figure, and 
11 irrigable acres figure, then Your Honor ' s task is very 
11 simple. It could be answered in one paragraph as to what 
13 the extent of the Winters reserve rights are. 
14 Unfortunately for the Tribes, although they may 
15 irrigate all of these lands today, these lands have all been 
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1 allotted out and what the allotment did, in effect, was to 
1 divide up, as Mr. Price pointed out, the WintErs reserve 
3 rights that were res erved for this valley by President Grant . 
4 I don't even intend to get into the problem of devolution of 
5 property ownership, and that is to say whether the Tribes 
6 are limited by the property rights held by those which have 
7 now given property to t he Tribes, including the Pioneer 
8 Educational Association. But it is the State's view that 
9 Your Honor should seriously consider that because of this 
10 factor , in order to determine a water availability figure 
11 and an irrigable acreage figure, that Your Honor must look 
11 to each individual allotment and in analysis , using the 
13 basic premise for each, nevertheless must be employed 
14 differently for each allotment. That is to say that 
15 Allotment -- and I forget which is the farthest north. I 
16 believe it is 526 -- although it has a certain irrigable 
17 acreage and a certain water duty, it is the same a s the 
18 water duty for 903. It has a certain different water 
19 availability for this reason: It was certainly not in the 
10 contemplation~ the federal government that the aquifer, 
21 for example, that underlies 903, was reserved for 526. 
22 There were certain waters that it was within the con templa-
13 tion of the federal government were reserved for that 
24 all otment, namely groundwaters, in a small supply , and 
1$ surface waters, and those surface waters, as used by every 




1 subsequent owner of 526, were Omak Creek waters. 
2 Now, in conclusion, I would say, Your Honor, that 
3 the question has arisen today as to Mr. Veeder's discussing 
4 the question, did Mr. Walton succeed to any Winters reserve 
5 rights, what happens in water-short periods? The simple 
6 fact of the matter is that all of the holders of Winters 
7 reserve rights by allotment in this valley have the same 
8 priority dates. I don't know how else one would determine 
9 that. So, since they all have the same priority date, I 
10 think one would look to traditional Western water law as 
11 to how to cut back. There certainly would be no junior 
12 appropriator, and since the federal government has not come 
13 up with some view as to how to do that in this valley, I 
14 don't know how it would be done, but I don ' t believe that 
15 truly is a problem. From our standpoint, at least, M.r. 
16 Wal·ton 's Winters reserve right, , the ex·tent to which he 
17 has succeeded to one, has the same identical priority date 
18 as all of the others in this valley, and they would share 
19 water equally, and according to that right, in bountiful 
20 as well as in drought periods. 
21 Thank you, Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Veeder, you asked for a 
23 chance to answer the contentions . 
24 MR. VEEDER: Yes, Your Honor, and the 
2$ regrettable thing about it is that perhaps I should have 




1 asked for several hours, in light of the language that has 
2 been used here. For example, Mr. Mack just got through a 
3 moment ago saying that Omak Creek waters had been used to 
4 irrigate 526. That is simply untrue . There is not a 
5 scintilla of evidence in the record that 526 was irrigated 
6 from Omak Creek, not one word. I think he is confused. 
7 There is land at the mission that has been irrigated, but 
8 that is not part of 526. That is not part of 526, and I 
9 think it is a, really an outrage to have the record 
10 distorted in the manner that this has been distort~d here. 
11 I realize the full implication of these things . 
12 I comprehend the pressure that the State is under, but I 
13 respectfully submit that we have been grievously put upon 
14 by what I believe to be a lack of understanding by counsel. 
15 I think that is the kindest thing I can say. 
16 There are several things, however, that I think 
17 that I have to turn to at once. 
18 Your. Honor commented, if I recall, that there was 
19 fishery water until the Tribe began irrigating. Perhaps I 
20 misunderstood what Your Honor said, but that is what I 
21 thought came through, that had the Tribe not started 
22 irrigating, there would be fishery water. Now, if I 
23 misunderstood Your Honor, I would refrain from pressing 
24 this thing, but the fact is there was no fishery water . 
2$ There was no water running past Mr. Walton's property during 




1 the spawning season. The only time water went by down below 
2 Mr. Walton's property was during the non-irrigation season, 
3 when he was not taking the water. I think Your Honor might 
4 be interested in our brief on this, at Footnotes 170 and 
5 179, and in Volume VIII of the transcriptr at page 661. 
6 We point out that, as soon as Mr. Walton turned on his pumps 
7 and began taking water, there was no water dc:M'n there, and 
a it killed the eggs that were incubating there, and certainly 
9 during the irrigation season, there never has been water dawr 
10 in that area because Mr . Walton took it all, and the evi-
11 dence proves that. 
11 Now, there is anotrer issue, and, of course, the 
13 preliminary injunction issue that is before Your Honor this 
14 afternoon becomes extremely important. The irrigable, the 
15 irreparable damage issue, I think, has been fully covered. 
16 I think that we are suffering irreparable damage; I think 
17 ·that damage is great; I think that from the standpoint of 
11 closing down 903, and may I say that by closing dawn 903 
19 we have lost 30 acres of crop . Now, it has been that kind 
20 of thing that brought us to this point of having to request 
21 a preliminary injunction, an injunction that would give us 
22 some relief for the balance of the irrigation season, and 
23 I think that is a very vital issue this afternoon. 
24 Now, in that regard , we have statements about 
2$ public use by counsel for the Waltons. I think that when we 




1 review the law in this matter, the issue of public use comes 
2 up in regard to Indian reservation, in regard to schools, 
3 and the other matters, end the public interest is of 
4 importance under the circumstances here. No one ever 
5 suggested that -- in fact, we put in evidence to the con-
6 trary -- that the Paschal Sherman Indian School, while 
1 supported by the Tribes, has the benefit of the No Name 
8 Creek ·suppl y of water, and some of the income, and some 
9 of the substance comes from it, but the destruction of that 
10 is irreparable damage, just as much as any other kind and 
11 type of irreparable damage that transpires. No one said 
12 the Paschal Sherman School would be supported and maintained 
13 by that irrigation system. So, I wish to clarify that 
14 situation right now. No one ever a sserted. 
15 Now, in regard to possibility of success - - that 
16 is one of the elements in regard to a preliminary injunc-
11 tion - - on the possibility of success, I believe it has been 
18 conceded here, because counsel for Waltons, and, indeed, 
19 everyone else, has said, no, we are not going to take all 
20 of the water away from the Colville Confederated Tribes. 
21 There is going to be some kind of a sharing. Now, I have 
22 read the cases as carefully as anyone can, and I have found 
23 not one word about a sharing. I find no basis for sharing 
24 here. I point out, and no one even responded to this, 
2$ either to our briefs or to our arguments, Your Honor, that, 




1 absent some kind of legislation taking from the Colville 
2 Confederated Tribes the rights that were vested in them, 
3 those rights would continue to reside with the Colville 
4 Confederated Tribes, and this is the issue before Your 
5 Honor: BY what act were they deprived of these rights? 
6 What took the water from them? 25 u.s.c. 381? Well, the 
7 only possibility of 25 u.s.c. 381 being sensibly utilized 
8 is the memo that we have outlined on the just and equal 
9 distribution of the varying quantity of water on each parcel 
10 of Indian land, and, as I have said, it is truly limited to 
11 the Indians and not to the Waltons. 
12 There are other factors that I will touch upon 
13 very rapidly, and, once again, I am greatly concerned over 
14 the language that was used. The statement that there is 
15 some kind of an aquifer down below the granite lip in 901 
16 and 903, well, that is absolutely contrary to anything in 
17 this case. There was no aquifer dawn there, and there was 
18 no aquiclude. I think the counsel for the Waltons confused 
19 the green lands there as what is designated as irrigable 
20 lands. Those are irrigable lands, Your Honor. It has got 
21 nothing to do with groundwater, has no·thing to do with an 
22 aquifer . 
23 I move on once more to the issue of 46 percent of 
24 the lands within the No Name Creek basin. That, once again, 
2$ has nothing to do with this issue. Those waters that do 




1 come down, the small amounts that do come down, come down 
2 in the winter and spring, ~1d the evidence supports that, 
3 so there is nothing here where you can get additional supply 
4 of water for 901 and 903. 
5 Now, the 1956 Act was borne down again very heav-
6 ily upon restoring "surplus lands" that had been previously 
7 been opened for homestead acquisition. Now, the 1956 Act 
8 has nothing whatever to do in regard to No Name Creek basin. 
9 Nothing. The 1956, I repeat, did not restore one thing or 
10 was there anything taken from it, the No Name Creek basin, 
11 by reason of the opening of the lands, the surplus lands, 
12 for homesteading. There were no homesteading lands so the 
13 1956 Act in no way pertained to them, and manifestly did 
14 not pertain to the rights to the use of water. 
15 We move on down to another situation, repeated 
16 reference to the Omak Creek. Your Honor, we went through 
17 this repeatedly, and Your Honor, in my view, correctly 
18 ruled that the only issue that was here was the waters for 
19 allotments being served from No Name Creek . Obviously, 
20 Omak Creek has a .contributing factor, the infiltration of 
21 water. No one has even suggested that that be taken away, 
22 but we are saying, and I think this is extremely important 
23 in view of the state of the record in this case, that when 
24 the Waltons tried to appropriate Omak Creek water, the State 
2$ of Washington denied those petitions because of objections 
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1 that were interposed, because of objections to -- there was 
2 no water available. Now, I confess, Your Honor objected to 
3 my offer of that proof, but that offer is in the evidence 
4 today. I mean it is in the record. It is extremely 
5 important that the State of Washington refused to allow 
6 permits to appropriate water out of Omak Creek when the 
7 Waltons made an application for it. I think that that is 
8 an element that is going to be highly important in this 
9 record. 
10 I move on down to another element that I think 
JJ Your Honor has had brought to your attention on repeated 
12 occasions this afternoon, and among them were that the 
13 allottees in some manner are going to be damaged by this 
14 lawsuit and by a decree in it. We move into the issue that 
15 was raised by counsel for the Waltons and the fact that 
16 there were some, and I don •·t -- I think this is a matter 
17 of rebuttal rather than argument should have been 
18 rebutted rather than argued here by counsel, and he didn't 
19 raise it on rebuttal, but the reference is made to the 
20 parties who allegedly -- and I don't agree that this is 
21 true -- allegedly were not signatories to these leases, 
22 these 10-year leases under which the operations are going 
23 forward today. Bear in mind, however, that if there is 
24 some substance ·to what counsel said, the leases were signed 
25 by the Superintendent of the Colville Indian irrigation --




1 the Colville Indian Reservation, fully authorized by the 
2 Secretary of the Interior, and the reference may be of 
3 importance to Your Honor, 25 C.F.R. 131.2, in which there 
4 is provision for the Superintendent, he stands in the shoes 
5 of the Secretary in this matter, to sign for allottees , and 
6 these are not allottees, they are fractional owners. What 
7 their interest is, if there are such people, we don't know . 
8 But we do know that the Superintendent had this authority 
9 and we do know that he signed them, so there is no question 
10 that these leases are valid and the allottees have full 
11 power and authority to ask that the Colvilles represent them 
12 in this litigation. 
13 A very, very important point, Your Honor, that I 
14 think we have to turn to in regard to the request for the 
15 preliminary injunction, there are not 105 acres of irrigated 
16 land by the Waltons. They are not irrigating 105 acres 
17 today . The evidence that we put in showed -- and that they 
18 put in, we used their map that there was 65 acres at the 
19 very outside . In fact, there is less than that . So, if, 
20 in some manner, Your Honor should turn to how this could be 
2 1 allocated, we cannot live with 105 acres of irrigated land 
22 for the Waltons. That is an extremely important issue and 
23 one of the principal reasons why I objected strenuously to 
24 this tabulation. It has got down here 100 acres of land 
2$ for the Waltons. That simply is incorrect, Your Honor. 











There may be 100 acres of irrigable land, but Your Honor 
knows there is a great difference between irrigated and 
irrigable land, so any prorating on the basis of a hundred 
would be grievously in error from the standpoint of the 
Tribes, if there is to be any kind of an apportionment, and 
I would certainly resist it, is that the allocation would be 
on the basis at the outside, of 65 for the Waltons and 157 
8 for the Tribes, or, if we are going to go on an irrigable 
9 basis, it would be 105 acres for the Waltons and 228 for the 
10 Tribes, but under no circumstances could we live with the 
11 idea that there would be that kind of acreage entitled to 
12 water, that is 100 acres for the Waltons . Under no circum-
13 stance would that be possible . 
14 We move to another issue and another mistake. It 
15 is stated that the Moomaws were Indians . Well, at the time 
16 they were certainly not Indians. They -- I guess they 
17 became a member of the Tribe in 1954 or something like tha~, 
18 but they certainly were not members at the time that the 
19 lands were purchased, and Moomaws did not purchase those 
20 lands. The lands went to the family of Whams, or however 
21 you pronounce it. So, it is not a matter of an Indian using 
22 water. This is extremely important, Your Honor, because we 
23 have the Department of Justice using Hibner. We hear Hibner 
24 talked all the way through. The issue was, were there any 
2$ lands irrigated by Indians antecedent to the sale of the 




1 properties to non-Indians, and the answer is, "No, there 
2 was not." 
3 We come, again, to the issuance of permits by the 
4 State of Washington,and if there is one basic element that 
5 we will stand by here, based upon the precepts of the law 
6 as we are fully acquainted, and I'm sure Your Honor is, that 
7 the State does not receive any benefits from the fact that 
8 the United States failed to interpose objection when an 
9 application was made. That laches and estoppel do not apply 
10 to the United States or the Tribes is very, very clear, and, 
11 once again, I h ave no way of knowing what they are talking 
12 about,~ether there were objections interposed or not, but 
13 there was certainly agreement by the State of Washington, I 
14 might add, after this case was initiated, that there would 
15 be no permits issued within the reservation, and that is an 
16 element, once more, an element that comes up anew in these 
17 matters. I realize, Your Honor, that we have pushed this 
18 clock a long way around this afternoon, and there are matters 
19 that, I assume, will be disposed of today, but we are dawn 
20 to the point, Your Honor, where we are taking the position 
21 that statements in the record that were made by counsel 
22 have to be corrected in regard to the appraisal of land, 
23 another issue that was raised. We go back and check the 
24 data that was before Your Honor in the record, and you will 
2$ find that there is no designation between irrigated and 




1 irrigable acres, irrespective of the comments and the 
2 matters that were read to Your Honor. It is clear that they 
3 made a difference in the appraisal between arable lands, 
4 that is dry lands, or rocky lands, and those are the 
5 distinctions. Once again, I sincerely hope that these 
6 matters will not be utilized against the Tribes. 
7 Finally, Your Honor, I'm going to make one more 
8 run through these cases. The Powers decision made no --
9 was a dismissed case. We know that, and we have argued it 
10 and put it in the brief. The Spear-Morgan case that 
11 apparently counsel has relied upon certainly had nothing to 
12 do with this. The Court said, we don't have jurisdiction. 
13 That was the one, the Spear-Morqan case, I reviewed that. 
14 The Alexander case has absolutely nothing to do with this 
15 situation. It pertained to the irrigation district on the 
16 Flathead India.n Irrigation Project under special legisla-
17 tion. The Kootenai Salish case was referred to. rt•s 
18 called the Namen case. That involved the sale of villas. 
19 A man went down and bought a piece of land bordering on 
20 Flathead Lake. Water rights were not involved in that case 
21 at all. It was, did the man have the right to build a 
22 wharf out from his land for boats? Did the man have the 
23 right to go down to the shore of Flathead Lake and have 
24 access to the lake? Water rights were not there involved, 
2$ nor was 25 u.s.c. 381 involved. 




1 Now, we turn to the Scholder case . Now, that case, 
2 and I brought it here because I think it is extremely 
3 important, Your Honor, that we look at these cases that were 
4 alluded to by counsel, and the decision that are applicable 
5 here and the excerpts that were copied out of them . The 
6 Scholder, S-c-h-o-1-d-e-r, v . United States , 428 F . 2d 1123 , 
7 did not involve water rights at all. It involved an a lloca-
8 tion of costs that they tried to place upon the Indian 
9 people , costs for the building of a reservoir, a building 
10 of a ditch across Indian land. Now, that has absolutely 
11 nothing whatever to do with this case . The quotat ions 
12 that were taken from it were lifted out of context, so we 
13 are in this position, Your Honor , that 25 u.s.c. 381 has 
14 never been construed by any court, and I submit that this 
15 is the first time through for it, where the issue was 
16 squarely presented, and I repeat what I said before, I empha-
17 size what I said before, that 25 u.s.c. 381 relates strictly 
18 to Indians and not to non- Indians . It relates strictly to 
19 a just and equal distribution among Indians and not 
20 allottees, and I thank Your Honor very much. 
21 MR. PRICE: Your Honor , I failed to make one 
22 comment with respect to the injunction matter, and I would 
23 ask the Court•s indulgence just to state that my understand-
24 ing of the law with respect to preliminary injunctions is 
25 to preserve the status quo and the courts, in cases I read, 
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1 interpret that as the last peaceable act immediately pre-
2 ceeding the initiation of litigation, and I do want the 
3 Court to be aware that we were seven years into this 
4 litigation when the Tribes embarked upon a program that they 
5 say now they are being harmed by not enough water. I do not 
6 believe that meets the test of "last peaceable act prior to 
7 initiation of the lawsuit". 
8 MR. VEEDER: Well, I would like to respond to 
9 that. Under the circumstance where counsel for the Waltons 
10 agreed to Your Honor's order of July 14, 1976 authorizing 
11 and recognizing and approving the Colville Irrigation 
12 Project, the installation of the wells, and the operation of 
13 the wells, was the last peaceful period among the parties. 
14 It was agreed to by all of the parties, and I respectfully 
15 submit on review that that would be known as a status quo. 
16 THE COURT: Well, Counsel, this matter of 
17 status quo is really a kind of a shorthand for the elements 
11 that go into consideration for preliminary injunction. The 
19 Ninth Circuit has heavily criticized that use as a test, and 
20 I think properly so because, really, what they are talking 
21 about is status quo. You are talking about looking at the 
22 elements that have already been alluded to here. Where is 
23 the relative merit, the relative damage? Is it a permanent 
24 damage? Can it be redressed by some other action? What of 
2$ the probability of success? I really think those are the 




I things the Court has to look at on the preliminary injunc-
2 tion, and although the status quo has come into our 
3 language, as I say, it is kind of a shorthand as to how to 
4 arrive at these other elements . But on that matter, it is 
5 the Court's view in the matter that probability of success 
6 in this is far from certain. 
7 I have some real problems as I approach the final 
8 decision in this case. When I look at the matter of rela-
9 tive damage, who is going to be hurt by whether I grant or 
10 deny a preliminary injunction , I think that becomes a little 
11 one-sided. I think that if the Waltons are wrong in their 
12 exercising rights which they may not have when we reach the 
13 end of this case, that the Tribe has adequate redress . I 
14 don't think I see anything here of a permanent damage~ 
15 There is a temporary damage such as you alluded to, Mr . 
16 Veeder, that you may have already lost 30 acres of a hay 
17 crop . That can be priced, and if the Waltons caused that 








the other hand, to cut off the Waltons' water at this stage, 
that seems to me, causes a different type of damage that is 
pretty hard to determine because there is an ongoing busi-
ness operation and the mere fact that they may lose a crop 
may not be the whole story, and so, as I look at the 
relative positions of the parties, I'm going to deny the 
preliminary injunction. Hopefully, this is going to be for 





1 a rather short period of time, as soon as I can get on to 
2 my final analysis of what you gentlemen have told me here 
3 today and, hopefully, it will not be too protracted before 
4 I render a decision, at which time the aggrieved party may, 
5 of course, exercise a right of appeal, at which time the 
6 question of holding things in abeyance will become super-
1 sedeas bond of some kind, I presume. But as things stand 
8 now, I will deny the preliminary injunction, and the case 
9 stands submitted. 
10 MR. ROE: Your Honor 
11 MR. SWEENEY: Excuse me, Your Honor. I 
12 believe Mr. Roe, at the start o f his argument, in reference 
13 to the two new cases, wanted to know whether the Court 
14 would accept a memorandum. 
15 THE COURT: Yes. 
16 MR. SWEENEY: And I hate to see another 
17 brief in this case. 
18 TEE COURT: Well, I don't want to cut off 
19 anybody's right to educate the Court. However, these are 
20 new cases that have come in since the briefs were in. I 
21 think I can read those cases and make up my own mind about 
22 how they fit into the problems that face me. I just don't 
23 have the cases yet to read. I simply got them at noonr the 
24 one case, but Law Week, next week r will have those cases 
25 verbatim, and I will read themo 




1 MR. SWEENEY: And then neither the State nor 
2 the United States will submit a brief; is that correct? 
3 MR. ROE: Well, we would like to -- we think 
4 that the cases are very beneficial to our position. We would 
5 like to do that. I heard Your Honor, and I know he reads 
6 well, but we would like to point out some 
7 THE COURT: Well, my difficulty here, I don't 
8 want to unduly protract this case. It has been going on too 
9 long already. Now, if you can submit a brief, then Mr. 
10 Veeder has a right to give his awn analysis of what these 
11 cases say. Now, how many days are you going to take to do 
12 this? 
13 MR. VEEDER: Your Honor, I petition Your 
14 Honor to shut this thing down, and we will take whatever 
15 consequence flows from it. I would like to conclude future 
16 briefs• being filed in this matter, Your Honor . 
17 THE COURT: Well, I think we just as well cut 
18 it off and if I misconstrue the cases, why, you can tack it 
19 onto motions for reconsideration, I guess. So, the matter 
20 will stand submitted. 
21 MR. ROE: Your Honor, I just had one other 
22 thing. There was a statement by Mr. Veeder tha.t there was 
23 an agreement by the State, apparently not to issue any 
24 further permits within the boundaries of the Colville 
25 Reservation during the course of this trial, and no permits 




1 have been issued. I just wanted -- I don't know of any such 
2 agreement, and, secondly, I don't think it is in the record 
3 of this case, and, secondly, there have been permits issued, 
4 at least one to my personal knowledge, for agricultural 
5 irrigation out of the Columbia River out of excess waters. 
6 THE COURT: It may or may not have any 
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